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FROM FAIRNESS TO CONTRACT: THE NEW
DIRECTION OF THE RULES AGAINST
INSIDER TRADING*
Jonathan R. Macey**
INTRODUCTION

The history of the regulation of insider trading1 is largely the
* Copyright 1984 by Jonathan R. Macey.

* Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law. A.B., Harvard University 1977;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1982. The author is grateful to Peter H. Aranson, William J. Carney,
Fred S. McChesney, Henry G. Manne, William T. Mayton and Timothy P. Terrell for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I received valuable research assistance from Cynthia
Alexander, Emory Law School class of 1986.
1. As used in this Article, the term "insider trading" refers to trading on the basis of
information not yet reflected in the price of a firm's securities. Such information is "inside
information" because it is "nonpublic." It is not yet known by the market at large. Modern
portfolio theory as well as the efficient market hypothesis, see infra note 55, suggest that only
insiders can systematically outperform the stock market.
The securities law restrictions on insider trading derive from section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and the Securities & Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984), as well as from section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to the SEC's
authority under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act gives the SEC authority to prohibit "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance." Id. Rule 10b-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
Section 16(b) restricts certain statutorily defined insiders from making "short swing" securities transactions within a six month period. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Because of the
extremely limited scope of section 16(b), this Article will focus exclusively on Rule lOb-5. The
ubiquitous Rule lOb-5 is referred to in over 3,000 cases, and more than 100 decisions expressly
concern insider trading. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule l0b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Pri-
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story of the legal system's quest to find an internally consistent justification for banning such trading.2 It is not unusual for a legal rule
to prove difficult to apply, but what is remarkable about Rule 10b-5
is that there is such ambiguity as to its basic nature and purpose.

Initially, the rule was thought to be grounded on notions of "fair-4
ness" and "equity." 3 These justifications were vague and ill formed
and did not provide a coherent basis for imposing legal sanctions.
This Article argues that the real concerns about insider trading
vacy, 9 J.

LEGAL STUD. 801, 804 (1980).
2. This Article will argue that the Court's justification for Rule lOb-5 was initially
grounded on notions of fairness, and has gradually shifted to a "business property" theory
predicated on the fiduciary duties of certain parties to the owners of the information. But see
Scott, supra note 1, at 803-04 (positing that the rule continues to expand unfettered). Professor Scott believes there is a "paucity of serious consideration of the purposes of rule lOb-5."
Id. at 803. This is a surprising observation considering the mammoth amount of literature on
the subject, much of which ventures some justification for the rule. See, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 322 (1979); Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of
the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982); Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus.
LAW. 1009 (1966) (panel discussion); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967). Professor Scott extracts
"three different conceptions of the rule and its objectives" from the available materials. These
conceptions are: (1) that the rule is supposed to serve fairness and equity, (2) that the rule is
designed to "[facilitate] the flow of information to the market," and (3) that the function of
the rule is to "[afford] protection to the property rights of the firm in inside information. Scott,
supra note 1, at 804. Other justifications for the rule are: (1) that insider trading undermines
public confidence in the capital markets; see Brudney, supra, at 334-35; Carlton & Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1983); Karjala, Statutory
Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal Markets, 1982 DUKE L.J. 627, 629; (2) that
insider trading impedes corporate decisionmaking; see Haft supra at 1053-64; (3) that insider
trading permits managers to profit from bad news as well as good, thereby creating incentives
to take abnormal risks and operate the corporation ineffectively; see R. Leftwich & R. Verrecehia, Insider Trading and Managers' Choice Among Risky Projects 20-22 (Aug. 1981)
(University of Chicago Graduate School of Business Working Paper 63) (on file with HOFSTRA
L. REV.); and (4) that insider trading raises the firm's cost of capital; see Brudney, supra, at
356; Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 470 (1969).
3. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
4. The origin of the intellectual opposition to the fairness conception is Professor
Manne's seminal work, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET. Professor Manne suggests that insider trading may not be harmful to the plaintiffs seeking redress, and he argues
that insider trading is an important form of entrepreneurial compensation. H. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93-110, 131-45 (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the
Law Professors,23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Manne, Law Professors].
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 857 n.l. See also infra note 52. Perhaps the strongest
indictment of the federal regulation of insider trading is that publicly held corporations have
themselves done little in the way of formulating their own rules to curb insider trading. In a
real world with a highly competitive capital market, one would expect that if outside shareholders believed they were being harmed by insider trading, companies would eliminate such
conduct by intra-firm rule. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 859. But see Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117 (1982).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss1/2

2

19841

Macey: From
Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
FROM FAIRNESS TO CONTRACT

are concerns about the optimal allocation of information among parties. Consequently, the fairness considerations of earlier years are
better analyzed in contractual terms. This Article further contends
that this analysis explains the Supreme Court's rejection of generalized notions of fairness, and its move towards analysis that focuses
exclusively on the specific contractual relationships among the parties affected by insider trading. 5
The Court's present 1Ob-5 analysis evinces a new understanding
of the fact that privileged corporate information is a valuable asset
in the nature of a property interest. The real concerns about insider
trading are, therefore, concerns about the origin and scope of this
property interest.
The long-standing confusion about the nature of Rule 1Ob-5
stemmed from a failure to conceptualize the problem of insider trading in contractual terms. The small number of commentators who
have suggested that insider trading prohibitions might be justified in
certain contexts because such trading involves the "theft" or "misappropriation" of someone else's property6 have failed to recognize the
extent to which the Court is already doing precisely what they suggest.7 What is needed now is an articulation of the theoretical underpinnings of this "property rights" analysis, and a means for determining how such rights are to be allocated among parties competing
to use the information. This Article provides the framework for such
an analysis.
The Article begins by describing the transformation of the Supreme Court's conception of Rule 10b-5. The Court's current formulation, as set forth in Chiarellav. United States8 and Dirks v. SEC,9
has evolved dramatically from the days of such early and intellectually unsatisfactory decisions as those in Speed v. Transamerica
5. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
6. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 878; Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309;

Scott, supra note 1.Several of the justifications for insider trading described in the articles in
note 2 seem to assume sub silento that the rule against insider trading is based on a theory

that assigns the property right in privileged information to the firm to which such information
pertains. None of these articles suggests that the courts are moving towards the adoption of a

business property theory in its interpretation of Rule lOb-5, and none suggests how such property rights ought to be assigned. These are the purposes of this Article.
7. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 885-86; Easterbrook, supra, note 6, at 310,

321; Scott, supra note 1, at 814-15.
8.

445 U.S. 222 (1980); see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.

9. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Corp."° and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.."" The direction of the
Court's reasoning has been from the general to the specific; generalized notions of fairness have given way to concrete analysis of the
relationships among the parties competing to profit from the use of
valuable information. But this evolution is by no means complete.
The Court has failed to articulate a legal rule that ensures that this
property right will be allocated among parties in an optimal manner.
The Court's recent opinion in Dirks failed completely in this regard. 12 This Article, therefore, suggests an alternative method for
determining how to allocate property rights in valuable inside
information.
In addition, this Article describes the enormous ramifications of
the Court's shift to a "property rights" focus in its application of the
rules regarding insider trading. Consistent application of the Court's
analysis will yield radically new legal rules regarding damages and
standing for insider trading violations. Even the venerable "disclose
or abstain doctrine,"' 3 which permits insiders to trade on the basis of
material, nonpublic information if they first disclose it, is now subject to considerable doubt. All of these traditional rules are fundamentally inconsistent with the Supreme Court's new rationale for
prohibiting insider trading. 4 These rules were developed to conform
to an earlier conception of Rule lOb-5, which the Court has now
categorically rejected.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the Court
has moved steadily towards reason in its application of Rule lOb-5.
The rule has developed to the point where it may now be applied to
promote the efficient use of information, but it has not yet completed
its metamorphosis. The Court's current test for allocating property
rights in information is badly in need of improvement, and the
Court's rules regarding standing and damages lag far behind the rest
of the Court's analysis.
10. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), reaf'd on later motions, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del.
1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952), opinion on damages, 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955),
modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
11. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d

Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
12. See infra notes 143-153 and accompanying text.
13.

See infra text accompanying note 43.

14. See infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text (describing Court's version of a business property theory).
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I. A

BRIEF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF RULE 10B-5

Since the promulgation of Rule 1Ob-5 it has been illegal for a
corporate insider to engage in securities transactions on the basis of
material, nonpublic information."5 New theoretical justifications for
the prohibition have emerged periodically as the old ones have perished under the weight of their own incoherence, and an intellectual
history of the rule can be plotted by marking the periodic emergence
of new judicial justifications. As the law has moved towards a rational interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5, the rule's application has finally
begun to produce outcomes that enhance allocative efficiency.16
A.

The Early Days: Fairness

Not surprisingly, in the early days of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence
the rationale for proscribing insider trading was the most incoherent.
At common law, a corporate insider was often under no obligation to
17
disclose material inside information before buying or selling stock.
The effect of Rule 1Ob-5 on the outcome of legal disputes was clear
as early as 1951 as a result of Judge Leahy's decision in Speed v.
Transamerica Corp. 8

In Speed, Transamerica, the majority stockholder in the AxtonFisher Tobacco Company, knew that Axton-Fisher's tobacco inventory had a market value greatly in excess of the value recorded in
the firm's financial statements.' 9 In order to capture the value of the

tobacco inventory for itself, Transamerica bought out the minority
15. See Macey, Book Review, 93 YALE L. J. 1173 (1984) (describing origins of Rule
lOb-5).
16. Because information is costly to produce, a market price for information should be
determined to achieve its most efficient allocation. See Stigler, The Economics of Information,
69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Allowing the party that produces information to profit from this
activity will ensure that the socially optimal quantum of information is produced.
17. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191-95 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing the evolution of the common law rules); Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who
PurchaseShares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 54-58 (1960). But see Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419
(1909) (director and seventy-five percent owner liable for purchasing shares of the corporation,
through an undisclosed agent, on the basis of nonpublic, material, inside information);
Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-ChiarellaRestatement, 70
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1982). There was often an exception to the common law rule that
silence or non-disclosure was not actionable, where the parties stood "in some confidential or
fiduciary relation to one another." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (5th
ed. 1984); RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977). See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136
Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 P. 277 (1904); Oliver v.
Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
18. 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-32 (D. Del. 1951).
19. Id. at 843.
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shareholders for a price far below the liquidation value of their
shares.20 Transamerica then dissolved the corporation
and reaped the
2
benefit of the enhanced value of the tobacco1.
Minority stockholders in Axton-Fisher, J. Louis Geller and William S. Speed, brought separate suits against Transamerica. Geller
brought an action at common law for deceit. 22 Speed, on the other
hand, based his case on Rule lOb-5. 23 The court granted Transamerica's motion to dismiss Geller's common law suit because the corporation had not made active misrepresentations to the plaintiff, and
thus was not liable for fraud under Kentucky law. 24 Speed's lOb-5
suit, however, brought before the same judge and based on the same
facts, ultimately resulted in a substantial judgment against the
corporation.25
Judge Leahy could not point to any particular language in the

rule as the basis for his holding. 28 He did, however, provide a theoretical justification for his decision by defending the rule as a means
of preventing uninformed stockholders from being treated unfairly:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. It is an attempt to
provide some degree of equalization of bargainingposition in order
that the minority may exercise an informed judgment in any such
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The action was brought in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. Geller v.
Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 626 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d
Cir. 1945), petitionfor leave to file bill of revision based on discovery of new matter denied,
63 F. Supp. 248 (D. Del. 1945).
23. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457-58 (D. Del. 1947) (holding that
plaintiff's complaint alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5).
24. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd per
curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945), petitionfor leave to file bill of revision based on discovery of new matter denied, 63 F. Supp. 248 (D. Del. 1945). Under the Kentucky corporation
law, "an officer or director [could] purchase stock from a minority shareholder without being
burdened with the obligations of a fiduciary." Id.
25. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), reaffd on later motions, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952), opinion on damages,
135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (prejudgment interest
increased from 2% to 4%).
26. Leahy seems to have relied primarily on clauses (1) and (2) of Rule lob-5, but he
concluded that the rule's three clauses "are mutually supporting and not mutually exclusive."
By this he apparently meant that the defendant's breach of its duty to disclose was "a violation
of all three subparagraphs." 99 F. Supp. at 829. Professor Loss has noted that "Judge Leahy
reacted with some impatience to the defendant's attempt to pin the plaintiff down among the
three clauses of the rule." L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 826 (1983).
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transaction.. . . One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . .was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own
financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed public security
7
holders.1

This passage represents a judicial interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5
that is clear and unequivocal. The rule's purpose was thought to be
maximizing fairness and equity among trading parties. For a person
with superior information to buy or sell from an unsuspecting trader
was thought to be inherently unfair when that person received his
information by virtue of his position as a corporate insider. The
SEC2 8 and some commentators 29 still consider fairness to be the basis for the rule.
As many have pointed out, however, not only is insider trading
not inherently unfair,30 but "unsuspecting traders" who trade with
insiders may in fact benefit from the presence of such insiders in the
marketplace. 3 ' In addition, the "fairness" justifications for imposing
27. 99 F. Supp. at 829 (emphasis added).
28. The SEC has brought a record number of insider trading cases under the current
administration. See Matthews & Becker, The 'Shad-FeddersCampaign' FocusedSharply on
Fraud;Insider Trading Dominated, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 12, 1983 at 40 ol. 1 (more than 20% of
the 97 insider trading cases brought by the SEC since 1949 were filed in the last three years).
The SEC has "made a point of repeatedly emphasizing that this is a prime area of concern
and a principal target of its enforcement activities." Farley, A Current Look at the Law of
Insider Trading, 39 Bus. LAW 1771 (1984). The SEC has proceeded on the premise that
insider trading is unfair. See infra note 133 (quoting SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad).
29. Commentators who embrace the fairness conception of lOb-5 include inter alia HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER

116 (1981); Ferber, The Case Against In-

sider Trading: A Response To Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); Painter, Rule
IOb-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 699, 714 (1971); Schotland, supra
note 2, at 1439 (arguing that even if insider trading increases economic gain it should still be
prohibited in order to "satisfy such noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards and integrity"). Other commentators support restrictions on insider trading but fail to articulate a rational justification for the rule except that it is "not right" to allow insider trading. See Brudney, supra note 2, at 353-67; Kaplan, Wolf v. Weinstein: Another Chapter on Insider Trading,
1963 Sup. CT. REV. 273; Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate
'Insiders' in the United States, 33 MOD. L. REV. 34 (1970). See also Easterbrook, supra note
6, at 323-30 (describing and refuting various permutations of the fairness argument).
30. See H. MANNE. INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 110 (1966) (the chance
of investors being hurt by insider trading is slight); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 880-82;
Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 323-30; Scott, supra note 1, at 805-09.
31. If "fairness" concerns do not explain the origins of Rule 10b-5, Interest Group theory may. Interest Group theory predicts that legislative and regulatory outcomes are often the
result of pressure from discrete economic groups. See Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974) (analyzing both public interest and interest
group theories of government regulation and concluding that interest group theory is promising
but flawed) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Economic Regulation]. In fact, "[m]ost recent eco-
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liability on insiders finesses the central issue. By declaring insider
trading "unfair," the court is implicitly presuming that the price the
plaintiff originally paid for her stock did not reflect the possibility
that the insider might engage in insider trading. The basis for such
an assumption is by no means obvious. In addition, the "fairness"
argument assumes sub silento that the legal system should assign the
rights to use insider information to the public at large. This assumption, which has been rejected in recent Court decisions, prevents
those who created valuable information from profiting fully from its
use.

Even aside from the flaws described above, the "fairness" justification for insider trading rules, as presented in Speed, went much
too far. Taken to its logical extreme, this vision would ban virtually
all trading activity.3 2 It will almost always be the case that one party

has an "advantage" over the other in a given securities trade. One
side is likely to have greater knowledge about the relevant supply
and demand for a particular stock.3 3 One party will inevitably have
nomic analyses of legislation have focused on statutes that appear to promote the narrow selfinterest of a particular industry or a group of firms within an industry." Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 271
(1982). In a nutshell, this theory views legal rules as economic goods demanded and supplied
in the same way as other items of value in society. Legal rules thus flow to the groups that
value them most as measured by the ability of such groups to pay for them. See id. See also
Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1982).
Given the lack of a public debate regarding the purpose for Rule lOb-5, it is likely that
the SEC, acting as a "political support maximizing regulator," enacted Rule lOb-5 in order to
maximize the support received from some political constituency such as large brokerage firms
or organized exchanges. See Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of
Deregulation, 27 J. L. & EcON. 273 (1984); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). See generally Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211-40 (1976); Posner, Economic Regulation, supra,
at 335-58.
32. As Professor Scott has observed, the fairness approach to Rule lOb-5 "focuses on the
individual parties to a particular trade and asks whether one has an 'unfair advantage' over the
other in some respect. . . . Judging by the opinions and commentaries, unfairness is one of
those qualities that exist in the eye of the beholder and elicit little effort at explanation." Scott,
supra note 1, at 805.
33. Exchange Specialists consistently have an advantage over their trading partners by
virtue of their access to the so called "limit order book" which enables them to know the
relevant supply and demand curves for the stocks they trade. Customers who wish to buy stock
at prices beneath the current market and customers who wish to sell at prices above the current market communicate their trading prices to the specialist. The specialist records these
prices in the limit order book, and executes the customers' orders if the market moves accordingly. Suppose, for example, that the market for a particular security is $20.00 bid and $20.50
offered. A customer who places a limit order to sell at $21.00 will be first in line to have his
order executed if the market moves up and a $21.00 bid is entered. Thus the specialist has an
inherent informational advantage over other traders since he had access to a range of reserva-
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greater sophistication, knowledge, intelligence or expertise.3 4 The

trick, of course, is to determine which of these advantages is "unfair." If, as the court indicated in Speed, the goal of the rule is to
provide complete equality of bargaining among traders, then there is
no logical reason to confine the reach of the rule to informational

disparities among trading parties.3 5
Later cases in the "fairness" era attempted to somehow articulate which informational advantages are unfair and how outsiders
are harmed by insider trading. The journey down this precarious intellectual trail has led the courts inexorably to the business property

theory that is in its infancy today. 6
The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 37 fully
embraced the fairness concept as the proper theoretical basis for assigning liability under Rule lOb-5. The SEC brought an action to
force certain officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) to disgorge large

profits made from trading in the firm's stock.38 These profits were
made by TGS insiders who knew that test holes drilled by the company showed the firm to be on the verge of making a mammoth ore
tion prices for the security in which he specializes. Block traders have a similar inherent advantage over other parties. See generally G. L. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 203-18 (3rd ed.

1963); B. SHULTZ,

THE SECURITIES MARKET AND

How

IT WORKS

124-52 (A. Squier ed.

1963). See also Brudney, supra note 2, at 365.
34. Scott, supra note 1, at 805. Professor Brudney has stated that "[t]he principle that
forbids trading on informational advantages which others cannot overcome or offset lawfully is
not without difficulties in application .. " Brudney, supra note 2, at 365. Information is
leaked systematically to market professionals "because of corporate managers' symbiotic relationship with financial analysts and other professional advisers of large institutional investors."
Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 11 (1980) (footnote
omitted). See also Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regulators, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 7-8, 12-13 (1973).
35. Profess~r Scott has observed that "[t]here are other disparities of equal or greater
importance and the rule's potential for . . . expansion is clear." Scott, supra note 1, at 805.
See also Brudney and Clark, A New Look At CorporateOpportunities,94 HARV. L. REV. 997
(1981).
36. Interestingly, the business property theory was alluded to in the very early case of In
re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), as one of the two "principal elements" upon
which Rule lOb-5 is analytically based. Id. at 912. Cady, Roberts was the first case to hold
"tippees" liable for violations of Rule lOb-5. The other element, according to the SEC, was
"fairness." Unfortunately, the fairness concept was the only one of these elements analyzed or
discussed in the SEC's opinion. Even the fairness rationale was discussed only conclusorily
when the opinion posited that Rule lOb-5 is "designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others." Id. at 911. It is
impossible to know why this early reference to the business property theory was never discussed, analyzed, or developed.
37. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
38. Id. at 839.
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discovery.39 The company stood to make huge profits if it could acquire the mineral rights to the land upon which the test holes were
40
drilled.
The court found the TGS officials guilty of violating the rules
regarding insider trading. The court's opinion has generally been
considered part of the "process of extension" 41 of Rule 1Ob-5, largely
because it adopted from Cady, Roberts4 2 the now famous "disclose
or abstain" doctrine which requires that:
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing

it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.43
The court, however, placed a highly significant restriction on
this seemingly open ended formulation. Specifically, the court decided that Rule lOb-5 does not require disclosure every time there is
assymetry of information among trading parties. 4" After Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the fairness requirement would be satisfied so long as both
parties could have acquired the relevant information. In the court's
words, "the Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of
the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information. 45
This "equal access" approach to insider trading reduced the
possibility, left open in Speed, that greater trading skills or superior
investigative expertise could provide a basis for recovery in a 1Ob-5
suit. 48 The "'equal access to information' view of fairness became
the dominant approach, although some other conceptions were still
alluded to from time to time in the cases."' 47 The flaw in the equal
39. Id. at 844.
40. Texas Gulf Sulphur had discovered "the famous Timmins ore find ... estimated to
contain 55 million tons of copper, zinc and silver." H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET 40 (1966).

41. Scott, supra note 1, at 802. See also Dooley, supra note 34, at 30 (describing the
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur as containing the sort of "glib generalization" that was "once
the hallmark of Rule 10b-5 opinions").
42. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
43. 401 F.2d at 848.
44. Id. at 848-49.
45. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
46. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
47. Scott, supra note 1, at 806. While Professor Scott is correct in saying that the fairness conception of Rule lob-5 was the dominant basis for liability during the fairness era, he
erroneously concludes that the fairness conception continues to be the theoretical underpinning
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access approach to insider trading is that it ignores the costs of ob-

taining information. To prohibit a party with superior access to information from profiting from that access removes all incentives to
supply the information to the market.

From a property rights perspective, during the early days of
case law development under Rule lOb-5 courts considered privileged

corporate information to be held in a sort of constructive trust by
corporations for the benefit of the general public. Corporations and

their agents, when in possession of material nonpublic information,
had to turn this information over to the investment community gen-

erally, or refrain from using it themselves. This trust arrangement
was considered necessary because of the fairness concerns described

above, since it was thought that the public would somehow be
harmed if the corporation were to use this information. But it is not
at all clear that the public has a right to information created by

private firms. Not only has the public not paid for information created by these firms, but the corporations on whom the obligation to

disclose or abstain is imposed often incur great expense to develop
valuable information. 8 To deny these firms the ability to fully exploit this information for profit diminishes the wealth of the shareholders who have paid for the information to be created.
B.

1976-1979: A Period of Transition

While the opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur was a marked imfor liability under Rule lOb-5. It is the thesis of this Article that the theoretical underpinning
for the rule has shifted by virtue of the Supreme Court opinions in Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Liability for lOb-5 violations is
now founded on a theory of breach of fiduciary duties, a theory that finds its own roots in a
"business property theory" of insider trading liability.
48. The most obvious example of the effort and expense involved in developing valuable
information occurs in the tender offer context. Prospective tender offerors:
must do substantial research to identify underpriced corporations and to determine
how their management can be improved. They may engage investment banking
houses and investigate the affairs of many corporations before finding one whose
management could be improved. The position of the tender offeror is particularly
precarious because, at the time it makes a bid, its investment in information about
the target is sunk.
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1178 (1981).
Insider trading cases seem to arise most often in the context of corporate control transactions such as tender offers. Consequently, the above quoted observations by Professors Easterbrook and Fischel are particularly relevant. The cost of obtaining information in other contexts
has also been well documented. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843-44 (describing
the expenses incurred by the corporation to acquire information about minerals in the Canadian wilderness).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 13:9

provement over the bottomless pit of liability suggested by the rationale of Speed, the courts had not yet faced the most difficult question to plague proponents of Rule lOb-5 - the question of damages.
In this respect, the "fairness"
era can be characterized as an era of
"glib generalization" 49 by courts concerning the theoretical underpinnings of Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court opinions in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder

°

and Santa Fe Industries v. Green51 evince a

significant change in judicial approach. These cases represent a significant yet unsuccessful attempt on the part of the Court to answer

a difficult theoretical question posed by Professor Manne as early as
53
196652 and by others more recently.
49. Dooley, supra note 34, at 30. Professor Dooley was referring specifically to the generalization contained in Texas Gulf Sulphur that the 1934 Act was intended to prevent "inequitable and unfair practices." Id. (footnote omitted).
50. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
51. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
52. The question posed by Professor Manne in the wake of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision was, in essence, "how are the plaintiffs in these cases being harmed?" Professor
Manne observed that "there is both a plus and a minus for the outside sellers from insider
trading." H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102 (1966). Manne divided
selling outsiders into two relevant sub-groups: those who sell at a particular time ("time-function" sellers) and those who sell when the stock reaches a particular price ("price-function"
sellers). See id. at 94-96. "Time-function" sellers may actually benefit by insider trading because they would have sold when they did whether or not the insiders engaged in trading
activity. The insiders' trading activity benefits this group by moving up the price of these
shares. See id. at 101-02.
Suppose, for example, that an outsider, X, was planning to sell 100 shares in Texas Gulf
Sulphur stock on April 10, 1963, a date during the period in which insiders were buying TGS
shares. The insiders' purchases drove the price of TGS stock up. During the period in which
the insiders were trading, "the market price of TGS stock fluctuated but steadily gained overall." 401 F.2d at 847. On March 31, the stock price had been only 26. The insiders' buying
drove the stock to 301s by April 10. X was thus unquestionably better off because the insider
bought. Insider trading will generally cause stock trading to move in the "current direction."
See infra note 110 (discussing efficient market hypothesis).
Manne suggested that "price-function" sellers are likely to be harmed by insider trading.
H. Manne, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 102 (1966). His theory is that outsiders who decide ex ante to sell their shares when they reach a certain price (known as a reservation price) would have sold at 3011s on April 10. According to Manne, however, these outsiders would have been better off if there had been no insider trading and if the outsiders had
held on to their stock until the corporation announced its discovery. If there were zero insider
trading, and if the firm's announcement caused a sudden jump in the price of the stock to a
level far above the outsiders' reservation price, then the outsiders were harmed by the insider
trading in the sense that they could have sold their stock for more than they did if the insiders
hadn't traded.
There is a fundamental practical flaw in this portion of Professor Manne's otherwise penetrating analysis. He is assuming that there is perfect enforcement of insider trading rules.
However, as he states, "because perfect enforcement of the full-disclosure rule does not and
probably cannot exist, any possible harm to outsiders . . . must be considerably discounted."
Id,at 103. The question, therefore, becomes whether the "price-function" sellers are better off
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Manne pointed to the facts in Texas Gulf Sulphur and concluded that the plaintiffs, all of whom were selling shareholders, had
actually benefited from the insiders' trading.54 The insiders, in buying TGS stock on the basis of inside information, drove the price of
the stock up by signalling to the market that new and valuable information about the firm's stock was available. Consequently, unless the

selling plaintiffs were somehow induced to sell by the purchasing insiders-a highly unlikely possibility in anonymous market transactions such as these-there was no basis for ascribing liability to the
insiders. Without insider trading the plaintiffs would have sold at a
lower, "incorrect price." 55 Thus, Manne argued, to the extent there
is any market impact from insider trading, those engaging in trades
with insiders are actually better off as a result of such activity betrading in a market that allows insiders to trade freely, or in a world of imperfect enforcement
of the proscriptions against insider trading. It is likely that in the real world, where the only
alternative to permitting insiders to trade is a world of imperfect enforcement, "price-function" sellers as well as "time-function" sellers are better off if insiders are permitted to trade.
Essentially, this is so because insider trading, particularly when done by large numbers of
insiders, will cause the price of the stock to adjust to its correct level far more quickly than the
surreptious insider trading that will be done if such trading is prohibited.
To the extent that investors have fully diversified portfolios of securities, they will be
indifferent about whether the insiders in the firms in which they own stock engage in insider
trading. Holders of diversified portfolios will expect to benefit from insider trading as often as
they will lose, and will not be harmed by particular instances of insider trading.
53. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 1, at 814-15. Indeed, a veritable cottage industry arose
among academics attempting to respond to Manne's assertions. See Manne, Law Professors,
23 VAND. L. REV.547 (1970) (noting the intensity of criticism generated by his 1966 book,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET, supra note 4).
54. See supra note 52 (discussing Manne's arguments).
55. Prices are said to be correct or incorrect to the extent that they arise from supply
and demand conditions that accurately reflect all currently available information about the
underlying corporation. Various hypotheses predict the quality and amount of information that
stock prices are likely to reflect. The "Efficient Market Hypothesis" is the umbrella phrase
that is used to describe the general observation that stock prices reflect information with relative speed. There are three essential versions of the hypothesis. The "weak" form of the efficient market hypothesis (known as the random walk theory) predicts that current prices fully
reflect the information implied by the historical sequence of prices. The "semi-strong" form
predicts that current prices fully reflect public knowledge about the underlying companies.
"The strong form asserts that not even those with privileged information can often make use of
LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-71 (1973). The quicker the price of a stock comes to reflect all

it to secure superior investment results." J.

known information about the underlying corporation, the more efficient the market for that
stock is considered to be. Put another way, the more efficient the market for a particular stock,
the more quickly the stock price will "correct" to a new level when new information about the

relevant corporation becomes available. See R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND
RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 42-54, 115-131 (1969); Fama, Random Walks in Stock
Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55-59 (1965); Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction To
Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68-77 (1974).
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cause they are receiving a higher price than they would have gotten
had the insider stayed out of the market." To answer Manne's assertions it is not enough simply to invoke vague notions of equity.
1. The Scienter Requirement.-The plaintiffs in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder were customers of First Securities, a small Chicago
brokerage firm.5 7 Leston Nay, the president of the brokerage firm,
swindled these customers by convincing them to put their money in
"'escrow' accounts" that he promised "would yield a high rate of
return."58 As it turned out, however, Nay embezzled the money.
Nay committed suicide, First Securities went bankrupt, and the
plaintiffs' lawyers turned their attention towards the accounting firm
of Ernst & Ernst.59 Their theory was that the accounting firm had
"aided and abetted" Nay's 10b-5 violations by failing to conduct
proper audits of First Securities.6" In their response to interrogatories in the district court, the plaintiffs did not claim that Ernst &
Ernst had engaged in intentional or deliberate fraud in the conduct
of its audits.6 ' This left the Supreme Court to decide whether "intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud" must be shown in order to maintain a private suit under Rule lOb-5. 2
The Court's opinion, holding that negligence would not sustain
a violation of 10b-5, relied primarily on the language and history of
Section 10(b).6a Justice Powell conceded the rather obvious but im56. See supra note 52.
57. 425 U.S. 185, 189 (1976).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 190 n.4.
61. Id. at 190 n.5. See also Appellant's brief at 82, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U,S. 185 (1976).
62. 425 U.S. at 193. The Court did not address whether reckless behavior is sufficient to
sustain liability under Rule lOb-5. Instead, the Court left that question for the lower courts to
decide. Id. at 193-94 n.12. The lower courts have overwhelmingly decided that recklessness
will suffice to sustain liability under Rule lOb-5. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114,
1117 (10th Cir. 1982); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3rd Cir. 1979); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Coleco Industries, Inc., v.
Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793
(7th Cir. 1977).
The Court also expressly left open the question of whether the SEC must prove scienter in
actions for injunctive relief. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. This question was resolved in Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (holding that "the rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably leads to
the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, regardless
of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought").
63. 425 U.S. at 212-14.
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portant point that subsections (b) and (c)6 4 of Rule lOb-5 could be
read as proscribing negligent as well as intentional conduct. 65 Turning again to the statute and its legislative history, the Court nonetheless held that such an interpretation would exceed the power granted
to the SEC by Congress under Section 10(b).66
After Hochfelder, Rule lOb-5 might have been a dead letter.
That is, since manipulation and deception were now necessary components of lOb-5 actions, the rule would not have prohibited insider
trading unless plaintiffs could show that the insiders induced them to
trade. By requiring a showing of manipulation or deception, the
Court presented the defendants with the opportunity to present precisely the sorts of arguments that Manne was suggesting. The Supreme Court was implicitly acknowledging the possibility that insider trading might not be harmful to market participants.
2. Internal CorporateMismanagement.-SantaFe Industries v.
Green67 followed on the heels of the Court's opinion in Hochfelder.
In Santa Fe the Supreme Court held that corporate mismanagement, absent actual fraud, was not within the ambit of Rule l0b-5. 68
The Court thereby wrestled primary responsibility for promulgating
rules concerning corporate governance out of the grips of the SEC
and returned it to the state legislatures.
Between 1936 and 1973, Santa Fe Industries acquired 95% of
the stock of Kirby Lumber Corp.6 9 In 1974, Santa Fe obtained the
remaining 5% of the stock in Kirby by availing itself of the Delaware
"short form merger" statute,7 0 which permits a corporation owning
90% or more of another corporation to effect a merger upon approval
of the dominant corporation's board of directors. The statute does
not require the corporation to give advance notice to, or obtain the
consent of, the minority shareholders. 711 The plaintiffs in Santa Fe
objected to the terms of the merger, complaining that use of the Delaware statute in this case would constitute use of a "'device,
64. Id. at 212. See supra note 1 (quoting relevant text of lOb-5).
65. Id. at 212.
66. Id. at 214.
67. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
68. Id. at 479.
69. Id. at 465.
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 253(a) (1974).
71. Id. "However, notice of the merger must be given within 10 days after its effective
date, and any stockholder who is dissatisfied with the terms of the merger may petition the
Delaware Court of Chancery for a decree ordering the surviving corporation to pay him the
fair value of his shares, as determined by a court-appointed appraiser subject to review by the
court." 430 U.S. at 465-66 (construing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253, 262 (1974)).
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scheme, or artifice to defraud.' "72 In a logical extension of its decision in Hochfelder, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments, reversing the Second Circuit, and rejected the proposition that a
breach of fiduciary duty, absent "deception, misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, '73 violates Rule lOb-5.
Taken together, the Court's opinions in Hochfelder and Santa
Fe represent a significant step forward in the Court's conception of
Rule lOb-5. In Hochfelder, the Court made it clear that it would
only countenance lOb-5 litigation if plaintiffs could show manipulation and deception. In Santa Fe the Court affirmed Hochfelder, and
went on to hold that otherwise permissible corporate practices are
not per se illegal under 10b-5 merely because plaintiffs consider
them to be "unfair" ex post. During its period of transition, the Supreme Court, while not yet squarely rejecting the fairness approach,
began to question its legitimacy. The Court's demand that plaintiffs
show actual manipulation or deception to prevail 4 led to the ultimate demise of the fairness approach and the Court's shift towards
adoption of the business property theory. It was not until later, however, that the Court provided a persuasive answer to the question
"who is harmed by insider trading?".
C.

The Modern Era: Underpinningsof a Business Property
Theory

The origin of the Court's current theory of insider trading liability is Chiarellav. UnitedStates.75 Vincent Chiarella worked in 1975
and 1976 as a "markup man" for Pandick Press, a financial printer.
Much of Pandick's business comes from clients making tender offers
for other companies. These clients are required to make extensive
filings76 and disclosures concerning these tender offers. 77 Pandick
72. 430 U.S. 462, at 466-67 (quoting Plaintiff/Appellees' complaint).
73. Id. at 476.
74. In requiring a showing of scienter, the Court was opening the door for defendants to
argue that plaintiffs were not harmed by insider trading because they were not induced to
trade by the insiders conduct. Cf. supra note 52.
75. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
76. Williams Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982) Sections 13(d)-(e) and
14(d)-(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which are collectively known as the Williams Act, regulate tender offers. The Williams Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d) to (e)
(1982). Section 14(d)(1) requires any person making a tender offer for publicly traded securities to file with the SEC whatever information the SEC may prescribe by rule, if the offer
would result in such person becoming the beneficial owner of more than five percent of a given

class of securities.
77. Id. The SEC has promulgated rules requiring a tender offeror to submit information
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Press is retained to print these disclosure documents.
A firm making a tender offer has a strong incentive to keep secret the name of the company for which the offer is being made.
Should the tender offer be announced prematurely, the price of the
target company's stock will go up, making the target's shares more
costly to the offering firm. As a result, firms hiring Pandick Press
and other financial printers are in the practice of concealing the
identities of the target corporations by using blank spaces or false
names in their documents;78 the true names are sent to the printer
only at the last possible moment.7 9 In addition, financial printers
such as Pandick make it clear that their employees are not permitted
to trade on the basis of information obtained in the course of their
employment. Vincent Chiarella toiled at his printing press in a room
decorated with notices imploring employees not to trade on the basis
of information gleaned on the job. 0
In spite of his employer's efforts to preserve secrecy, Chiarella
was able to deduce the names of target companies from information
contained in the disclosure documents."' Using this information, he
bought stock in the target companies before the tender offers were
publicly known, and realized gains by selling after the takeover attempts were announced. 2 Such trading enabled Chiarella to supplement his salary by $30,000 over a fourteen month period.8 3 Upon
discovery of this activity, Chiarella entered into a consent agreement
with the SEC84 and agreed to return his profits to the sellers of the
shares.8 5 He was also immediately discharged by Pandick Press.
In addition to the sanctions imposed by the SEC and by his
employer, the government brought a criminal indictment against
Chiarella, charging him with seventeen counts of violating Section
regarding the manner and purpose of its purchases, the source of the funds to be used in

making the purchases, and its plans regarding the future of the target company as well as
adequate financial information about itself whenever the entity making the offer is not a natural person, and such information is material to the target stockholders. See SEC Rule
14(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1984); Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1984).
The adequacy of the financial information that must be supplied depends "on the nature of the
bidder." Schedule 14D-l, Item 9, Instruction 1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1984).
78. 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).

79.

Id.

80. 588 F.2d 1358, 1369 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

81. 445 U.S. at 224.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. Action No. 2534 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1977).
85. 445 U.S. at 224. It is unclear, however, how such sellers were harmed by Chiarella's
purchases of their stock. See supra note 52.
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10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule lOb-5. 86 Chiarella was convicted and his conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit.87 On
appeal, the Supreme Court noted that an essential element of a
cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5 is an affirmative duty to disclose
material facts. 88 The Court refused to accept the argument that this
duty is owed to the trading markets generally. This refusal represented a flat rejection by the Court of the "fairness" rationale for
regulating insider trading; a conviction for insider trading would be
upheld only if the government could articulate some party to whom
the printer owed a specific legal duty.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, considered two possible
alternative sources of such a specific legal duty. First, a duty to disclose or abstain from trading might arise from Chiarella's relationship with the sellers of the target company's stock. 89 Significantly,
the Court concluded that Chiarella owed no duty to the people from
whom he bought his stock because "he was, in fact, a complete
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions." 90
Second, the Court rejected the conclusion that a trader owes a
general duty to all participants in market transactions. The Court,
holding that mere possession of material nonpublic information does
not give rise to a duty to disclose before trading,91 explicitly rejected
the "parity of information" theory espoused in Texas Gulf
Sulphur.9 2 Where a fairness rationale would focus on Chiarella's advantageous position vis a vis his uninformed trading partners, the
Court's analysis in Chiarella sounded in contractual terms. The
Court emphasized the necessity for a "specific relationship between
two parties"93 as a precondition to lOb-5 liability. The only possible
source for such a specific duty lies in Chiarella's relationship with his
employer, Pandick Press; a duty to disclose or abstairi would stem
from Chiarella's contract of employment. Although this issue was
not before the Court, the opinion indicates that Chiarella's employ86. Id. at 225. Chiarella "was charged with 17 counts of violating the Act because he
had received 17 letters confirming purchase of shares." Id. at 225 n.3.
87. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
88. 445 U.S. at 231.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 232-33.
91.

Id. at 235.

92. 401 F.2d 833.
93.

445 U.S. at 233.
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ment relationship would have given rise to a duty not to trade.9 4
Pandick Press had a strong interest in assuring that its employees did not trade on the basis of information garnered from its clients' tender offer plans. The company would not stay in business for
very long if its clients could not rely on confidentiality. The corporations making the tender offers in Chiarellainvested substantial sums
of money in connection with those offers, and Chiarella's trading
may have caused Pandick's clients to pay significantly higher prices
for the companies they sought to acquire.9 5 Chiarella's trading
harmed Pandick Press by damaging the integrity of the firm in the
eyes of its clients.
The fact that Chiarella's trading harmed the firm provided the
firm with a motivation for prohibiting such activity. It did not, however, provide Pandick with a right to prohibit Chiarella from trading. The existence of such a right must be grounded on a theory of
property rights in information.
In commercial affairs the actions of one individual or firm frequently harm others. If IBM improves the performance of one of its
computers, and its sales increase, its competitors may suffer a loss of
market share. While these competitors have a motive for prohibiting
IBM from implementing its product improvements, they have no
right to do so.
The right to prohibit another from trading on the basis of inside
information must stem from a notion that information is a form of
property interest. The Court's opinion presupposes that the information Chiarella used was a property interest, and that interest gave
Pandick the right to prohibit Chiarella from .trading. Otherwise,
Chiarella's trading would not have violated any preexisting duties. 6
94. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
95. As Professor Easterbrook observed, "Chiarella's trading posed a threat to the profits
of the tender offerors." Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 331.
96. Any doubts about the implications of Chiarella were dispelled by the Second Circui's holding in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-19 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 193 (1983). The holding in Newman relies squarely on a property theory to find
liability under 10b-5. In Newman, Adrian Antoniu and E. Jacques Courtois, Jr., employees of
the investment banking firms of Kuhn Loeb & Co. and Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., respectively, conveyed information about proposed takeovers and mergers to James M. Newman, a
securities trader with another brokerage firm. The information that Antoniu and Courtois conveyed was confidential and had been entrusted to Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb by their
corporate clients. Newman and others purchased stock in the target companies and made substantial profits when the mergers or takeovers were announced. Id. at 15. The court upheld
Newman's conviction, finding that he "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence." Id. at 17 (quoting U.S. v.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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The majority opinion in Chiarella is thus entirely consistent with a
business property theory of insider trading liability.
Corporations making tender offers have every right to prevent
others from profiting from news of such offers. Since these firms bear
the costs of such offers, they cannot legitimately be forced to share
the benefits with the trading markets generally. 97 The property right
in the valuable information that a tender offer is to be made is properly assigned to the corporation that creates this information,9" and
the corporation has the right to enter into contracts forbidding others
from profiting from its use. The agreements between the acquiring
corporations and Pandick are illustrations of such contracts. Had
Pandick not forbidden Chiarella from trading on the basis of the
inside information he acquired during the course of his employment,
Pandick would have been in breach of its service contract with its
clients, the acquiring corporations. Even if there were no legal rules
against insider trading, Chiarella's legal obligation not to trade
would still exist as a result of the string of contracts running from
the acquiring corporation to Pandick and down to Chiarella.
Viewed in this way, Chiarella's legal obligations had nothing to
97. Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). In Kaiser Aetna a land
developer, upon consent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, dredged a pond for use as a
privately owned marina. The government later sought to open the marina to the public under
the doctrine of navigational servitude. The government contended that the developer's dredging, which increased the average depth of the pond from two to six feet, rendered the pond a
navigable waterway. The Court rejected the government's argument, and found the marina to
be the developer's private property because the developer had a legitimate expectation interest
in the benefits of his dredging activity. Opening the marina to public use would cause a substantial devaluation of the property. The Court held that the right to exclude others is a fundamental and universal element of a property interest. Id. at 179-80.
98. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Peardon, ed. 1952):
[E]very man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but
himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it
in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state
nature has placed it in, it has by this labor something annexed to it that excludes
the common right of other men.
Id. at 17. Locke's analysis is particularly appropriate here because a corporation that makes a
tender offer expends great resources to do so. Information that a target company is an appropriate target may be said to exist in a "state of nature," to use Locke's analysis. To encourage
these wealth creating activities, we must provide the proper incentive for corporations to "create" the information by conducting research activities. Allowing incumbent management to
resist and defeat tender offers decreases the incidence of such offers and therefore ultimately
decreases shareholder welfare. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding To A Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981). Similarly,
rules prohibiting insiders from trading decreases the production of such information.
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do with the old "fairness" conception. He was guilty of converting a
valuable business opportunity to his own use, since this opportunity
belonged to the firm that created it and not to Chiarella. Properly
analyzed, Chiarella took information that he knew was intended for
the exclusive use of the acquiring corporations; his breach of fiduciary duty was equivalent to theft."9
By emphasizing the defendants' fiduciary relationship to the

owner of privileged information, the Supreme Court has begun to
finally recognize that concerns about insider trading are really concerns about the proper use of valuable privately owned information. 00 The concept of information as a property right as conceived
by the Court in Chiarella is consistent with the various theories of
property formulated by moral philosophers11 as well as the theory
espoused by the Court itself. 02
99. 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This conclusion is inescapable in the
Chiarella case. There is no question that the corporations making the tender offer bids could
lawfully purchase stock in the target companies so long as these purchases complied with the
provisions of the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d) to (e) (1982). See supra note 76. A
company making open market purchases of another company's stock can purchase up to five
percent of the other company's shares in open market transactions without disclosing its activity. Under Section 13(d), the company has ten days after purchasing the five percent in which
to file disclosure with the SEC. If the company's purchases are construed to be a "tender
offer," notice is required under section 14(d) when the tender offer is made. See Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). Thus it was obviously not Chiarella's trading qua trading that
was illegal, but rather the fact that he was trading on the basis of illegally obtained information. Indeed, the SEC itself implicitly recognized this distinction when it adopted Rule 14e-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240 (1984), approximately four months after Chiarellawas decided. Rule 14e-3
was designed by the SEC in the wake of Chiarellato impose liability upon tender offeror's
tippees who buy stock in target companies.
100. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
101. For sources of information regarding various theories of property, see L. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); R. SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY:
THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA

(1951); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on

the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1202-13
(1967). See also Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition
and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 874 (1982) ("The efforts to establish an
adequate theory of property are too diverse in style, perspective, conclusion, and implication to
be reduced to a single meaningful formula.").
102. See supra note 97 (discussing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979)). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court noted that "[i]t is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in
their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined." Id. at 577. "To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have. . . a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it." Id. See also Terrell, supra note 101, at 881-86 (observing that the Supreme Court has
employed a "reliance and expectation theory" in analyzing government entitlements); infra
note 109 (discussing precedent for recognizing property rights in intangibles). In some circumstances, it will be unreasonable for a corporation to have a legitimate expectation of a property
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THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
INFORMATION

Information has value. This is perhaps the one point on which
all sides of the insider trading controversy agree. It is possible for
people to make systematic gains from trading on the basis of material inside information, thereby turning an informational advantage
into a pecuniary gain. 103 Legal rules should be developed that insure

the optimal production of information. Analysis of how optimal production might be achieved is best seen by viewing inside information
as a form of property interest.
The conception of inside information as a property right is fully
consistent with the views of utilitarian theorists such as Jeremy Bentham104 and David Hume, 105 as well as with modern expositors of
07
law and economics such as Richard Posner,106 Guido Calabresi
and Frank Michelman.108 The ideas of these theorists differ radically, but they contain one common premise: legal rules, particularly
interest in information it has created. See infra notes 116-41 and accompanying text (discussing Dirks).
103. The evidence that insiders can make systematic gains from inside information is
substantial. This evidence tends to refute the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis
which predicts that stock prices reflect information so fast that not even those with privileged
information can make use of it to achieve superior trading profits. See J. LORIE AND M. HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 71.

The following empirical studies observe that insiders receive greater than market rates of
return from trading activity: Baesel & Stein, The Value of Information: Inferences from the
Profitabilityof Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 553 (1979); Finnerty,
Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141 (1976); Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation
Changes on Insider Trading,5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 93, 101-05 (1974); Jaffe, Special
Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974); Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider TradingActivity: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981);
Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J. L. &
EcoN. 35 (1968); Penman, Insider Trading and the Dissemination of Firms:ForecastInformation, 55 J. Bus. 479 (1982).
104. J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68-70 (Bombay 1975) (Principles of
the Civil Code, pt. 1, chs. 8-10):
Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the
relation in which we stand towards it .
[A]II things considered, the protection of the laws may contribute as much
to the happiness of the cottage as to the security of the palace.
Id. at 68, 70.
105. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 3, pt. 2, §§ 2-4 (2d ed. 1978).
106. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 3 (2d ed. 1977).
107. Calabresi & Melamud, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
108. Michelman, supra note 101.
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property rules, should be structured in such a way as to create incentives for individuals to use resources efficiently.
Our legal culture has a strong tradition of recognizing property
rights in intangibles."0 9 The fragile and ephemeral nature of inside
information suggests a strong need to protect the efficient use of this
information. Inside information is not a public good. Consequently,
the value of a particular piece of inside information can be used up,
and once it has been used up it is impossible for others to profit from
it. Suppose, for example, that someone has a piece of information
that will drive the price of a share of stock from its current price of
$5.00 to a new, "correct" 110 price of $7.50 when it becomes known
to the market. If, by purchasing the stock, an insider drives the price
of the stock to its appropriate level, that insider has prevented the
information's rightful owner from profiting by its use."'1 Once the
stock price has adjusted to $7.50, the opportunity for others to profit
from the information is gone forever. The insider has appropriated
109. Article I of the United States Constitution delegates to Congress authority "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." US. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.8 (emphasis added). Congress has exercised this authority by enacting statutes regulating patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982); copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1982); and trademarks, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of property rights in such
intangible expectational interests as social security benefits, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 332-33 (1976) (citizens have a legitimate expectation in social security benefits and, as
property interests, such benefits may not be denied without due process of law), and the right
to a public education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (right to a public education is
a property interest which may not be deprived without due process of law).
Confidential business secrets are specifically protected by criminal statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1702 (1982). "Confidential and nonpublic commercial information" falls within the definition of property under the mail fraud statute. United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383,
1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
110. Some commentators have asserted that insider trading should be permitted on the
basis that such trading will make the markets for securities more efficient. See Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 2, at 866. Efficient capital markets are desirable because the more accurately stock prices reflect information, the better these prices are as a guide to capital investment on the economy. Id. While Carlton and Fischel are correct about the social desirability
of efficient capital markets, it is not clear that legalizing insider trading will result in these
markets becoming more efficient. Certainly some information will be reflected in stock prices
more quickly. It is also to be expected, however, that corporate officers and directors may
delay certain other announcements in order to reap all possible trading gains from such news
before going public with it. In cases where the insiders delay public announcement in order to
trade, insider trading can be said to make the market less efficient.
11. Even if the insider's use of the information did not diminish the ability of the owner
to exploit it - i.e., even if inside information was a public good - the insider trading problem
would not disappear because there would still be a problem of underproduction of valuable
information. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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for his own use a thing of value: useful information. This information cannot be enjoyed in limitless quantity by everyone. Individuals
and firms will not find it sensible to invest in producing information
if they cannot profit from its use.
A primary function of property rights generally is to structure
'
incentives to achieve a greater "internalization of externalities."' 12
But the insider trading rules curtail the extent to which owners of
inside information can make use of such information. These limitations inhibit the creation of valuable information. Where Rule 10b-5
bans insider trading or forces the insider to share his property with
the market before trading, the legal system is "externalizing" all of
the benefits that might be derived from ownership.111 The owner of
the information bears all of the costs of acquiring the knowledge, but
must share any benefits with the marketplace in general. Firms will
have incentives to produce valuable information and thereby benefit
society by creating wealth only if they are able to internalize the
benefits as well as the costs of obtaining such information. This sort
of internalization is only possible if property owners are permitted to
contract as to the use of the information they own. To the extent
that the insider trading rules prohibit firms from entering such contracts, the owners
are unable to internalize the benefits of their
11 4
information.
Property rights need to be enforced in contexts where enforcement will facilitate a system of economic incentives that maximizes
societal welfare. The legal system need not assign property rights in
information in ways that do not maximize society's welfare.11 5 Cus112. See Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REv. No. 2
347, 348 (1967). An externality is an external pecuniary or nonpecuniary cost or benefit,
which is associated with an economic activity or endeavor. "Internalizing" an externality "refers to a process, usually a change in property rights, that enables [the cost and benefits] to

bear (in greater degree) on all interacting persons." Id. at 348.
113. The positive externalities associated with insider information include the possibility
that stock prices will more accurately reflect the true value of the underlying corporation, as
well as whatever other benefits (such as exposing fraud) might accrue from encouraging economic actors to ferret out information about corporations. To the extent that these positive
externalities cannot be internalized by means of insider trading, they will inevitably be underproduced. The legal system should, therefore, assign property rights so as to internalize these

and other externalities.
114.

See Demsetz, supra note 112, at 357-59.

115. Some economists have argued that the proper function of legislation is to increase
economic welfare by correcting market failure such as pollution, crime or deficiencies in charitable giving, These theories also apply to laws designed to effect wealth transfers. See W.
(2d ed. 1965); A. PIGOU,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). It is not necessary to adopt such a view in order
BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE
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todians of information that creates no incentives for efficient utilization of resources have no legitimate expectation that such information will be protected.
It is on this point that the Supreme Court's analysis faltered in
Dirks v. SEC.""6 Dirks provides an archetypal example of corporate
information in which the corporation had no legitimate property
right.
Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst and officer of Delafield Childs, Inc., a registered broker-dealer specializing in providing
financial analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors.117 In March of 1973 Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding, an insurance holding company, contacted Dirks and
informed him that Equity Funding's assets were vastly overstated as
a result of massive fraud within the corporation."" Secrist told Dirks
that Equity Funding was selling partnerships in nonexistent real estate and creating fictitious insurance policies and records." 9 Secrist
also charged that Equity Funding's "top officers had Mafia connections," and that the accounting firm of Haskins & Sells had dropped
Equity Funding as a customer because of a disagreement over Equity Funding's business practices.12°
The information Secrist supplied to Dirks was unquestionably of
great value. Once public, this information caused the price of Equity
Funding stock to plummet.12 1 Advance knowledge of these facts enabled owners of large blocks of Equity Funding stock to sell in advance of the price drop, thus avoiding huge losses. Similarly, traders
could consummate "short sales"122 or purchase "put" options 123 in
to conclude that the legal system should assign the property rights in "inside" information to
the party who will use them to maximize society's welfare. Allocative considerations, which
provide an alternative justification for assigning property rights, have no role whatsoever in the
area of insider trading. That is to say, no one has ever suggested either permitting or banning

insider trading on the basis that it serves to transfer wealth from one group to some other,
somehow more deserving group. In other areas however, such as public education, welfare

rights or social security, other considerations besides economic efficiency may play a dominant
role.
116. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

117. Id. at 648.
118. Id. at 649.
119. 681 F.2d 824 at 829.
120. Id. at 829-30.

121. 463 U.S. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Traders who expect the price of a stock that they do not own to go down can

"borrow" the stock, and sell the borrowed stock at today's high price. When the price of the
stock drops a profit is made by purchasing (also known as covering one's short position in) the
security at the new, lower price. The profit is the difference between the purchase price and
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order to further profit from knowledge of the debacle at Equity
Funding.
Dirks conducted a program of extensive research and investigation in response to Secrist's accusations."2 4 He began by examining
all of the publicly available data on Equity Funding's insurance
sales.' 25 He then contacted other investment analysts concentrating
in insurance company stocks to find out if they were aware of any
irregularities at Equity Funding. Dirks also contacted Stanley Goldblum, Equity Funding's Chairman of the Board, and asked him
126
about the charges.
When none of these conventional methods of investigation were
successful, Dirks interviewed retired Equity Funding executives, finally coaxing Frank Majerus, and later other former company officials, to admit to doctoring the company's insurance records or having been aware of such improprieties. 2 Dirks' motivation for such
exhaustive research was plain. As an analyst he received a commission for securities transactions that clients directed through his firm.
While the record does not reveal the precise amount of the commissions Dirks received, one institutional investor promised him $25,000
in commissions for the advice he provided.' 2 Dirks "openly discussed the information . . . with a number of clients and inves-

tors.' 29 Many of these people sold their Equity Funding stock, and
five investment advisers liquidated holdings of more than $16 million. 130 The value of the information Dirks provided to his clients
equals the difference between the price at which these firms sold
their stock in the market and the price to which the stock dropped
after the news of the fraud became public.' 3 '
the previous selling price less the interest cost incurred by borrowing the security. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 251-58 (1983).
123. An option is the right to buy or sell a particular security at a particular price
within a specified period of time. A "put" option is a particular type of option that gives the
owner the right to sell a particular security to the party on the other side of the option contract
for a specified price within a given period of time. As the price of the stock goes down the
value of the right to sell becomes concomitantly greater. See generally id.
124. 681 F.2d at 830.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 830-31.
128. 463 U.S. 649 n.2.
129. Id. at 649.
130. Id.
131. Neither Dirks nor his employer made any direct gains from trading on the basis of
the information regarding Equity Funding. Because of the extreme uncertainty as to the status
of the law on insider trading liability for someone like Dirks, it is likely that Dirks believed he
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The SEC censured Dirks for trading on the basis of the inside
information he had obtained about Equity Funding. 32 Harkening
back to the bygone fairness era, 33 the SEC contended that whenever
"'tippees' -

regardless of their motivation or occupation -

come

into possession of material 'information they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider' they must 1ei34
ther publicly disclose that information or abstain from trading."
The SEC's theory of liability was "rooted in the idea that the antifraud provisions [of the Securities laws] require equal information
among all traders."13 5 The Supreme Court had expressly rejected
13 6 The Court echoed this conclusion in
such a theory in Chiarella.
would be in violation of the law by trading himself. Such uncertainty may have meant that
Dirks was unable to capture the complete value of the information he uncovered.
132. 681 F.2d at 829.
133. The SEC has taken every opportunity to expand the scope of Rule lOb-5. See
supra note 99 (discussing SEC Rule 14e-3). The Chairman of the SEC, John S.R. Shad, has
said, "We've got to maintain a broad public perception that the public is being treated fairly.
If the public at large felt it was playing a rigged game or that someone had a marked deck, it
would impugn the integrity of the markets." N.Y. Times, May 27, 1984, § 3 (Business) at 21,
col. 6. Chairman Shad's remarks evince not only a complete lack of understanding of the
arguments of Professor Manne, see supra note 52, but misunderstanding of other, more basic,
economic arguments as well. Portfolio theory strongly suggests that from the outsider's perspective, insider trading, if permitted, would be irrelevant to the investor with a diversified
portfolio of securities. The theory, an integral part of modern finance theory, categorizes all
risk as either systematic or nonsystematic risk. Nonsystematic risk refers to risk factors that
are associated with a particular firm or stock. These factors include such things as the quality
of the firm's management, and the possibility that firm discoveries (such as that made by
Texas Gulf Sulphur) will affect the value of the firm's stock. Systematic risk relates to general
market risks. The general level of interest rates, and the overall state of the economy, are
examples of systematic risk. Portfolio theory suggests that investors, by purchasing a diverse
portfolio of securities, can eliminate all of the firm specific or nonsystematic risk associated
with owning a particular stock. This suggests that investors who trade in efficient markets,
where the price of a stock reflects all known information about the relevant firm, see supra
note 55, are "'protected' by the price established by the market mechanism." Scott, supra
note 1, at 808.
Professor Scott also observed that, contrary to Chairman Shad's prediction, investors
would not flee the securities markets if insider trading were permitted. In anticipation of
Shad's gambling analogy, Scott predicted that investors would simply adjust the purchase
price for stocks where insider trading is a possibility. Id. Professor Scott stated, "[I]f I know
you are using percentage dice, I won't play without an appropriate adjustment of the
odds ..
" Id. Casual empirical observation also shows that Shad is mistaken. The insider
trading laws do not serve as much of a deterrent to insider trading. Significant insider trading
still takes place, yet there has been no evidence that investors who do not have access to such
information are fleeing the marketplace. It is also true that institutional investors are playing
an increasingly larger role in the ownership of stock. Such institutions are easily able to diversify their portfolios, thereby eliminating all nonsystematic risk from their investments.
134. 463 U.S. at 651.
135. Id. at 657.
136. 445 U.S. at 233-34.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:9

37
Dirks.1
The Court's rationale for rejecting the SEC's approach was
based on a theory that recognizes the value to society of protecting
property rights in inside information. In this case, the property rights
were properly allocated to Raymond Dirks:

Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider
and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of
market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to
the preservation of a healthy market. .

.

. The analyst's judgment

.. . is made available [in various ways] to clients of [the analyst's]
firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the
public generally. 38
The Supreme Court opinion in Dirks, like the earlier decision in
Chiarella, protected the property interests of those who made socially desirable investments in acquiring certain information. In
Dirks, the Court reached the rather unsurprising conclusion that
holding Dirks culpable for his behavior would discourage other analysts from conducting similar investigations in the future. One way
to encourage such investigations is to afford Dirks and others like
him a property right in their discoveries, thereby permitting them to
reap the profits of their labor.
This is not to suggest that all information becomes the property
of its discoverer. Suppose, for example, that Dirks had received a tip
from Secrist that Equity Funding was about to launch a tender offer
for some other firm. Dirks should not profit from receipt of that information, because the information properly belonged to Equity
Funding. 139 Secrist, in providing the information to Dirks, would
have breached a duty to Equity Funding to keep this information
confidential. The Court in Dirks described the "initial inquiry" as
137. 463 U.S. at 656.
138. Id. at 658-59 (footnote omitted). After Dirks, the SEC finally began to base its
own enforcement cases on what it describes as a "misappropriation" theory. The SEC uses the
term misappropriation "to cover any stock activity in which an employee 'appropriates' confidential information from his employer and uses it to achieve personal gains in the market."
N.Y. Times, supra note 133, § 3, at 21, col. 2.
139. After Chiarella, the SEC interpreted this conclusion in its own rules. See SEC
Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1984). See also SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2112 (1985) (SEC enforcement action under misappropriation
theory).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss1/2

28

Macey: From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against

1984]

FROM FAIRNESS TO CONTRACT

being "whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider."14
The Court's inquiry is nothing less than a judicial allocation of property rights in the information in question. 14 1 Had Equity Funding
properly owned the information, Secrist would have violated a fiduciary duty to the corporation by disclosing it. Equity Funding, however, could not be said to have a legitimate property interest in news
about massive internal fraud. Recognizing a property right in this
kind of information would enable Equity Funding to prolong its illegal activity. As the Court recognized, society benefits by providing
people like Dirks with economic incentives to ferret out fraud, because it lowers the cost of preventing such activity.
III. ASSIGNING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INFORMATION

Unfortunately, the Court in Dirks failed to provide a satisfactory means for determining when a party can legitimately expect to
have a legally cognizable property right in information. In order to
determine whether there is a property interest, courts were directed
to focus on irrelevant criteria such as "whether the insider receives a
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings."1142
A.

The Court's Method of Assigning Property Rights in
Information

The Dirks holding regarding the allocation of property rights in
information sharply limits the utility of the opinion. In fact, had the
SEC known about this test in advance, the case might have turned
out entirely differently. It is very likely that Secrist envisioned re43
ceiving just the kinds of reputational benefits the Court describes;
140. 463 U.S. at 663.
141. The Court ignores that aspect of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)
that is based on "fairness" concerns, and emphasizes for the first time language in the opinion
that is consistent with the business property theory. The Court thus describes with approval
the two elements set out in Cady, Roberts for establishing a Rule lOb-5 violation: "(i) the
existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." 463 U.S. at 653-54. See also supra
note 36.
142. 463 U.S. at 663.
143. If Mr. Secrist envisioned gaining another job in the insurance business it would
have been extremely important for him to distance himself to the fullest extent possible from
the fraud at Equity Funding. From the perspective of a future employer, exposing the fraud
would be the surest way for Secrist to separate himself from the wrongdoing. Alternatively,
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it is not clear why the Court did not think he received any benefit.
The opinion implies that the information about the fraud at Equity
Funding belonged to Equity Funding, and that only Secrist's supposedly noble, public spirited motivation for giving the information to
Dirks enabled the Court to find that neither Secrist nor Dirks violated a duty to Equity Funding's shareholders. 4
Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that "Secrist violated his
duty to Equity Funding shareholders by transmitting material nonpublic information to Dirks with the intention that Dirks would
cause his clients to trade on that information.' 45 This reasoning
inexplicably assigns the property rights in information to the corporation to which it pertains. The majority opinion is even less satisfactory on this point. It would assign the property rights in the privileged information to the corporation unless the party in possession of
the information magnanimously gives46it away for a socially beneficial purpose such as exposing fraud.1
The majority's method of assigning such property rights will inevitably lead to an underproduction of information of the kind that
Dirks produced. Without the tip from Ronald Secrist, Dirks would
never have begun his efforts to uncover the fraud at Equity Funding.147 Having gone so far in the right direction, the Court erroneSecrist may have fully retired when he left his post at Equity Funding. As a disgruntled former employee forced out of the insurance business, it would not be surprising if Secrist was
trying to obtain a form of revenge on his former bosses at Equity Funding. Even so, Secrist's
tip to Dirks, if done for purposes of revenge, would result in an "indirect personal benefit" to
Secrist of the kind that the Court directs other courts to "focus on" for the purpose of obtaining liability. Id. at 662-63.
144. Id. at 665-66. It is impossible to imagine that the Supreme Court was suggesting
that revenge may be a proper justification for permitting individuals who owe a fiduciary duty
to their employers to disclose inside information. Yet, curiously, the Court in Dirks makes no
inquiry into Secrist's actual motives for disclosing the information about Equity Funding to
Dirks. The Court blithely assumes that Secrist's motives were purely benign. This alternative
is, of course, a possibility. It is by no means the only possibility. Yet the Court does not engage
in the very line of concededly complex inquiry that it directs other courts to pursue.
145. 463 U.S. at 678-79 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 660-61. The majority opinion will frequently require plaintiffs in lOb-5 cases
to embark upon bizarre and unnecessary investigations in order to prove that the tipper received some sort of personal gain from the tipping. SEC v. Thayer, No. 84 Civ. 0066
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1984), and SEC v. Brant, No. 84 Civ. 3470 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1984), are
examples of such cases. In Thayer, the prosecution's theory was that former Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer tipped because he received personal benefits from a woman with whom he
had a close personal relationship. N.Y. Times, supra note 133, § 3, at 21, col. 4. In Brant, one
of the allegations was that a defendant, R. Foster Winans, passed information along to his
roommate, David J. Carpenter. Id.
147. 681 F.2d at 829-30.
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ously attempted to "eliminate use of inside information for personal
advantage" by designing a liability rule that focuses on "whether the
insider will benefit, directly or indirectly from his disclosure. ' 148
The Court in Chiarellacorrectly identified inside information as
a property interest, but in Dirks the Court formulated a legal rule
that tends to assign the property interest to the least deserving party.
Suppose, for example, that Secrist had demanded that Dirks pay
him for his information. Under the Court's reasoning, liability would
attach to Dirk's conduct because the tipper, Secrist, received a "direct personal benefit from the disclosure."' 4 9 Yet society would have
no less of an interest in knowing about the corporation's fraudulent
activities, and the corporation should still have no right to keep this
information confidential.
B. An Alternative Approach: The Proper Subject of Contract
Test
In Dirks the Court erred in its quest to find a line of demarcation for tippee liability. The SEC had argued that Dirks should not
escape liability simply because the party who gave him information
had a "proper purpose" for doing so, contending that if a proper
purpose test was adopted, parties would always be able to avoid liability by fabricating such a purpose. 5 ' The Court's focus on the tipper's pecuniary or reputational benefit was a response to this contention. The pecuniary gain test is thus a means for determining
whether the information was transmitted for a "proper purpose."' '51
Implicit in the Court's proper purpose inquiry is a coherent notion of property rights. If Equity Funding had properly owned the
information that Secrist disclosed to Dirks, then under no circumstances would disclosure have been appropriate. Such disclosure
would have been a form of theft unless the corporation had granted
permission to have the disclosure made. 5 2
The Court's inquiry should have focused on whether the information disclosed by Dirks could properly have been the subject of a
contract between Secrist, the tipper, and Equity Funding, his employer. Such an inquiry would allow the property rights in insider
information to be assigned so as to maximize the production of use148. 463 U.S. at 663.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.

151. Id. at 663-64.
152.

Cf. supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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ful information. In the Dirks case, for example, it would have been
illegal for Equity Funding to have entered into a contract with Secrist that prevented him from exposing the illegal activities of that
1 3 The
firm. Such a contract plainly would have been void ab initio."
strong public interest in ferreting out the fraud at Equity Funding
would outweigh whatever contractual obligation Secrist might have
with his employer to keep this information confidential. For the court
to promote confidentiality in this context would encourage corporate
fraud by barring honest employees from exposing such activity. In
economic terms, enforcing a contract that requires an employee to
keep information about a fraud secret is allocatively inefficient.
Those potentially harmed by fraud must spend resources to protect
themselves. A finding that Dirks breached a fiduciary duty by exposing fraud would increase the expenditure necessary for innocent people to protect themselves. Such a result would waste real resources
and result in a transfer of wealth from society as a whole to the
officers of Equity Funding who engaged in fraud.
In Chiarella,on the other hand, it was perfectly proper for the
clients of Pandick Press to demand that information about pending
tender offers be kept confidential. No illegal purpose was served by
the confidentiality, and the information properly belonged to the
firms who created it. The "proper subject of a contract" test just
described would lead private parties to spend the optimal amount of
society's resources in the quest for information. In Chiarella,for example, if defendant's illegal stock purchases prevented corporations
making tender offers from fully profiting from the information they
created, there would be a suboptimal number of tender offers. In
Dirks, on the other hand, it was appropriate to allow the investment
analyst to use the information he obtained. Preventing him from doing so would facilitate continued fraud, and thus the result reached
by the Court in Dirks was entirely correct. Unfortunately, the "personal benefit" test that the Court used to determine liability often
will assign the property right in privileged information to the wrong
party, leading to an underproduction of information that would be
useful to the market.
The proper subject of contract test should, therefore, replace the
153. Contracts to perform illegal acts are void and unenforceable. See J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 781 (2d ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-

TRACTS §§ 178-79, 182 (1979). Where a contract is illegal by reason of the wrongful purpose
of one of the parties, that party has no rights against the other party. J.

CALAMARI

& J.

PERILLO at 783.
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pecuniary gain test that the Court enunciated in Dirks. The pecuniary gain test inevitably discourages parties such as Secrist from tipping to investment analysts and others. The proper subject of contract test utilizes the profit motive and the ability of firms to contract
to ensure that socially useful information will reach the market while
information that should be confidential will remain so.
Ronald Coase's seminal work, The Nature of the Firm,"" provides an important theoretical underpinning for the proper subject of
contract test advanced in this Article. His work, upon which the
modern theory of the firm is predicated, defines a firm as a nexus of
55
contracts among the suppliers of the organization's various inputs.1
A firm's decision about whether to hire a unit of production directly,
or to contract externally for it, is largely a function of transaction,
coordination and contracting costs. 156 There is no basis for making a
distinction between the fiduciary duties that result from a full time
employment contract and the fiduciary duties that arise from a contractual relationship with another corporation. The Court's present
fiduciary duty analysis attempts to make this kind of distinction by
suggesting that contractual insiders, such as employees, owe a fiduciary duty to stockholders, while contractual outsiders, such as printers
157
or investment analysts, do not.
This attempt to distinguish between insiders and outsiders gives
rise to many of the problems associated with the Court's current
analysis.' 58 The proper subject of contract test eliminates this distinction entirely. The presence or absence of a fiduciary duty should
be viewed as a consequence of a contractual relationship between the
firm and another party. It makes no difference analytically whether
or not the other party is a full-time employee of the firm or an independent contractor. It should make no difference legally, either.
154.

Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391-92 (1937).

155.

Id.

156.

Id.

157. But see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (outsiders such as underwriters, accountants, lawyers and consultants may be fiduciaries with liability for insider trading);
SECv. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (tippee liable under § 10(b) as a "temporary insider").
158.

See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288

(1980); Jensen & Meckling, infra note 189. See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at
231-35 (1980); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 888-89; Coase, supra note 154; Klein,

Crawford, & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J. L. & EcoN. 297 (1978).
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The Proper Subject of Contract Test Applied

It might appear from the preceding discussion that the proper
subject of contract test proposed in this Article will invariably be
easy to apply. Indeed, application of the test to the facts of either
Dirks or Chiarella is simple and straightforward. This will not always be the case.159 This section provides examples of how the
proper subject of contract test would apply to two rather notorious
cases of insider training.
1. "Heard On The Street."-In March, 1984, the Wall Street
Journal revealed that R. Foster Winans, a writer of the newspaper's
widely read "Heard on the Street" column, had informed certain
outsiders about stories he planned to write.160 The stories concerned
stock tips that Winans had culled from various sources within the
financial community. The information that Winans collected during
the course of his employment was valuable. The Wall Street Journal
paid Winans to collect it and distribute it to readers of the Journal.
If the information was "stale" when distributed in the paper, its
value was diminished.
Confidentiality was thus an integral and proper subject of Mr.
Winans' employment contract with the Wall Street Journal. Not
only was the newspaper within its rights when it fired Winans, but
under principles of agency law the newspaper also was entitled to
Winans' profits. Agents are compelled to account to their principals
for any profits gained through the use of confidential information.""1
Such an accounting must be made even if the principal cannot show
that it was damaged by the actions of its agent. 6 2 It is entirely
proper that the Wall Street Journal be compensated for the damages Winans imposed on the business reputation of the newspaper.
Despite language to the contrary in Dirks, liability in this case
159. Of course, as Justice Powell indicated, the "personal benefit" test articulated in
Dirks will not always be easy to apply either. 463 U.S. at 663.
160. 'Heard on the Street': A $900,000 Windfall, Newsweek, May 28, 1984 at 63; Winans, along with two co-defendants, was subsequently convicted of multiple criminal infractions. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
161. An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment
or in violation of his duties has a duty. . . to account for any profits made by the
use of such information, although this does not harm the principal. . . . So, if [a
corporate officer] has 'inside' information that the corporation is about to purchase
or sell securities. . . profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken because
of his knowledge are held in constructive trust for the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, Comment c (1958).
162. Id. See also Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss1/2

34

Macey: From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
FROM FAIRNESS TO CONTRACT

1984]

should not be contingent upon whether Winans obtained a pecuniary
or reputational gain by making these tips. Even if Winans had not
received any personal benefit, the damage to the Wall Street Journal
would still be the same.
Not only did the Wall Street Journal fire Winans immediately
upon learning of his activity, 16 3 the newspaper also conducted a thorough internal investigation, and published the complete results of the
investigation over several days.164 Later, the SEC reported that Winans had made $31,000 by supplying the information. The four people to whom he supplied it, David J. Carpenter, Peter N. Brant,
Kenneth P. Felis and David W.C. Clark, made a total of $909,000
from trading on the advance information. 16 5
The Wall Street Journal's own actions in firing Winans and
conducting such a thorough housecleaning indicate that the newspaper was damaged by its employee's trading. A newspaper has a
strong interest in developing a reputation for reliability. If readers
thought that the Journal'sfinancial news was tainted by its reporters' quest for personal profit, the paper's influence, and therefore its
readership and advertising revenues, would decline. 6 The only relevant question is whether the information properly belonged to the
Journal. Adoption of the proper subject of contract test proposed in
this Article would enable courts to provide an unambiguous answer
167
to this question.
2. Texas Gulf Sulphur Revisited. - Application of the proper
subject of contract test to the famous case of SEC v. Texas Gulf
163. See Newsweek, supra note 160.
164. The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6; Id. Apr. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 2;

Id. Apr. 9, 1984 at 1, col. 2.
165.

Id.

166.

For this point I am indebted to Professor Peter Aranson of the Emory University

Department of Economics.

To the extent that the information in Winans' column was of value to the readers of the
Wall Street Journal, he was depriving those readers of that value by exploiting the information

in advance of its general circulation in the newspaper. See Manne, A Case of SEC Again
Overstepping Its Limits, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 23, 1984 at Cl, col. 1 (stat-

ing that the Wall Street Journal was harmed by Winans' disclosures).
167. The Court's pecuniary gain test is particularly unsatisfying in those cases where the
tipper's liability is only cast into doubt because of the plaintiff's difficulty in establishing pecu-

niary gain. When insiders trade or tip they are either breaching a fiduciary duty or they are
not. The liability issue should hinge on the nature of the information disclosed, and whether it

properly belongs to the firm to which it pertains. For this reason, "the proper subject of contract" test is the mo.re appropriate means for determining liability. It relieves courts of the
need to indulge in the irrelevant inquiry into personal motives that the Dirks pecuniary gain

test envisions.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:9

Sulphur Co.' does not produce such unambiguous results. As described earlier, 169 Texas Gulf Sulphur insiders made an important
mineral discovery on land that they were testing in Timmins, Ontario. In order to profit from this important find, TGS had to acquire
the mineral rights to the land. 70 If news about the discovery had
become public, the company would have been forced to pay a much
higher price to acquire rights to the minerals. Thus, complete secrecy about the nature of the discovery
was essential to protect the
7
interests of the TGS shareholders.' 1
In fact, the company's officers and directors went to some
lengths to assure that news of the discovery did not become public. 7 2
After obtaining a visual estimate of the copper and zinc content of
the property, the company decided to acquire rights to the land. 73
Claude 0. Stephens, the President of TGS, told the group that had
made the discovery to keep the results of its findings "confidential
and undisclosed even as to other officers, directors and employees of
Texas Gulf Sulphur.' 74 In addition, the successful test hole was actually concealed, and a barren hole intentionally drilled, in order to
mask the group's findings. 75 Land samples were shipped outside the
country for chemical tests. 17 6 The company did not conduct any further drilling on the site until its land acquisition program was nearly
completed.' 77 But despite the compelling need for secrecy, several
corporate officers and directors took advantage of the privileged
in79
78
formation by buying stock and call options' in TGS stock.
The information about the mineral strike plainly belonged to
Texas Gulf Sulphur. The corporation, which had recently experienced financial difficulties, had a great deal at stake. 80 The infor168.

258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a.ffd in part, rev'd in part en banc, 401 F.2d

833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
169. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
170. 258 F. Supp. at 271.
171.

401 F.2d at 844.

172.
173.
174.

Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 843.

175.
176.

Id.
Id.

177.

Id. at 843-44.

178.

A "call" is a particular type of option contract by which the bearer receives the

right to purchase a certain number of shares of a stock at a fixed price within a fixed time
period. See id. at 841 n.3. See generally L. Loss, supra note 122, at 251-58.
179.

401 F.2d at 844.

180. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET, supra note 4, at 40
(describing poor financial condition of company prior to its mineral discovery).
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mation may in fact have been the company's most valuable asset. If
the corporate officers had attempted to profit by buying up the mineral rights themselves, they would have been guilty of usurping a
corporate opportunity." a Keeping news of the mineral discovery secret was therefore an implicit part of the employment contracts between TGS and its employees.
Under the theory suggested in this Article, however, the analysis does not end here. Two questions remain to be answered. First, a
court would have to determine whether the trading activity of the
TGS employees endangered the company's land acquisition program,
or harmed it in some other way. Next, even if the corporation was
not injured, it would still remain to be determined whether the insiders who traded actually had the corporation's permission to use its
information.
a. Danger to the TGS Acquisition Program.- Insider trading
causes stock prices to change by signalling the market that there is
new information about the stock being bought or sold.182 In the case
of TGS, it is entirely possible that the trading activity of the insiders
could have informed the market by enabling market participants to
estimate the nature of TGS's important discoveries. If such information forced TGS to pay increased prices to acquire the mineral
rights, the corporation was directly injured by the trading activity of
the insiders. 83 Since there was no evidence that this was the case, it
is likely that the positive signal sent to the market by the insider
trading was a vague one that did not result in harm to the corpora181. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974); Equity Corp. v.
Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (1966); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5
A.2d 503 (1939).
182. Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 336.
Purchases [of stock] often convey information to the market about the prospects of

the firms [whose stock is being purchased]. If the information indicates that the
firm's prospects are better than those previously perceived, the price of the shares
rises. Large purchases give the market a good deal of information. Traders find out

or infer why one person is buying so much, and the new knowledge causes prices to
adjust. For this reason, large transactions for technical portfolio-adjustment reasons

should have no effect on price, while smaller purchases based on new information
should have an effect, even a dramatic one. This seems to be the pattern in the
market.

Id.
183.

Suppose that Texas Gulf Sulphur's only assets were the exploration rights to the

tract of land in Ontario. A flurry of trading activity by insiders would likely inform the market
that something of significance was taking place on the tract. Market participants might then
decide to bid for the mineral rights to the land themselves, thus driving the price up, to the
obvious detriment of the TGS shareholders.
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tion of the kind just described. Had such harm occurred, however,
the damage to the corporation would have been precisely the same as
if the insiders had usurped the corporate opportunity by buying the
land themselves.
b. Breach of Contract. - Even assuming that the insider trading in TGS securities did not reveal the corporation's land acquisition program and drive up the price of the mineral rights, it is not
clear that the insiders had the right to trade on this information.
Professor Manne argues that it is socially desirable to allow insiders
to trade because it is the only satisfactory way to compensate the
entrepreneurs who are vital to the survival of large publicly held corporations.184 Under a business property theory of privileged corporate information, it would be entirely proper for a corporation to permit insiders to trade in the way Manne envisioned. It would also be
entirely proper for the corporation to forbid insiders to engage in
some or all such activity. 185 Such a rule was in place at Pandick
Press, where Vincent Chiarella worked, as well as at the Wall Street
Journal, where R. Foster Winans was employed.18 6 Both men were
immediately fired when their trading was discovered by their employers.187 The question in Texas Gulf Sulphur, therefore, becomes
whether the TGS insiders were forbidden (explicitly or implicitly) by
the terms of their employment contracts to engage in insider trading.
It would not have been unreasonable under the circumstances for the
corporation to have imposed such a stipulation on its employees.
Since secrecy was essential to the success of TGS's discovery,
184. See H.

MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET,

supra note 4, at 138-

41.
185.

We can expect that firms will permit insider trading if the value of the right to

engage in such trading is more valuable to the insiders than to the firm. Similarly, firms will be
expected to forbid such activity when the right is more valuable if retained by the firm. Given
the low costs associated with contracts between firms and insiders, if firms are allowed to
contract with their employees about whether they can engage in insider trading, the party who

will gain the most from having the right will receive it because he or she will be willing to pay
the most for it. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 863; see also Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). It may be, however, that the cost to the firm of insuring
that managers do not abuse their right to trade may raise the cost of transacting, thereby
making it more efficient for the firm to ban such trading. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
186. It is interesting to note that the disclosures by the Wall Street Journal about Winans' activity have "caused newspapers across the country to review policies regarding employees' stock ownership and the pre-publication release of newspaper stories." N.Y. Times, supra

note 133, § 3, at 21, col. 3.
187.

See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980); Newsweek, supra note

160, at 63.
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the corporation may have wanted to insure ex ante that its prospects
were not endangered by greedy insiders.188 Clearly the President of
the firm and the corporation's lawyers, both of whom engaged in
insider trading, were not in a position to evaluate dispassionately the
potential cost of their activity to the corporation. The corporation
may have wanted a blanket provision against insider trading as a
way of avoiding such palpable conflicts of interest.18 9 Because Texas
Gulf Sulphur was decided under a much different theory of insider
trading liability, 90 the court did not delve into the question of
whether the TGS employees were contractually constrained from engaging in insider trading. Under a business property theory, however, such an inquiry would have been dispositive.' 9 '
IV.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROPERTY RIGHT IN INFORMATION

It is appropriate at this point to consider the enormous implications of the Court's current insider trading doctrine. As things now
stand, a business property theory informs the Court's analysis of the
existence of liability for insider trading, but the old "fairness" theory
still controls other aspects of insider trading analysis. It is this lack
of a "grand unifying theory" that accounts for the current confusion
and incoherence in the law.
In Dirks and Chiarella the Supreme Court adopted a theory of
insider trading liability premised on the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty. The duty is owed to the owner of the inside information,
and it is this party that is harmed by insider trading. 1' 2 Consistent
with the Supreme Court's analysis, the party to whom the fiduciary
duty is owed should have standing to sue. Presently, however, only
purchasers and sellers have standing to sue under Rule lOb-5. 93 Yet
it is the owner of the property right who should be able to collect
damages, and it is the owner's injury that should provide the measure of these damages.
The rules regarding standing 94 and damages 98 for violations of
188. See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
189. This kind of provision would be a means of avoiding what Jensen and Meckling
have termed "agency costs." Jensen & Meckling, Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
190. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing business property the-

ory of insider trading liability).
192.
193.
194.

See supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
See infra notes 197-225 and accompanying text.
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Rule 1Ob-5 have lagged behind the rest of the Court's analysis in
Dirks and Chiarella. These rules are still informed by the old "fairness" conception of insider trading liability, and therefore must be
changed to conform to the Court's new analysis. In addition, just as
insider tradingis proscribed because it violates insiders' fiduciary duties, an insider's disclosure of privileged information is similarly
wrongful. Thus the disclose or abstain doctrine of Texas Gulf
Sulphur 9 6 is incompatible with the Court's current reasoning about
insider trading. In order to respect a fiduciary duty, an insider must
neither disclose nor trade.
A.

Standing

In light of the Court's fiduciary duty analysis, it seems ironic
that the only persons who may bring a private suit for violations of
Rule lOb-5 are purchasers and sellers who have bought or sold during the time the insiders were trading. Yet that is the law. In 1975
97
Justice Rehnquist, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,1
adopted the so-called "Birnbaum rule" of the Second Circuit,1 98 requiring that plaintiffs in 10b-5 cases be actual purchasers or sellers.
The irony is that the party to whom the fiduciary duty is owed lacks
standing, while outsiders to whom no duty is owed retain standing
but lack a basis for recovery.

1. Standing in the FairnessEra. - The holding in Blue Chip
Stamps is a striking example of the Court providing the best possible
answer when asked the worst possible question.' 9" Under the fairness
theory, the people injured by insider trading are those who would
have acted differently had they had the benefit of the insider's infor195. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
197. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
198. The name of the rule is derived from Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
199. 421 U.S. 723. The case was decided in 1975, or during what this Article describes
as the "Transition Period" of the Court's thinking about Rule 10b-5. The case represents an
effort on the part of the Court to limit the open-ended reach of the "fairness" conception of
Rule lOb-5. The case also provides an example of the Court's effort to provide a response to
the "who is harmed question." It seems clear that the opinion evinces some dissatisfaction with
the intellectual underpinnings of the "fairness" rationale for lOb-5 liability. If the Court
thought insider trading was inherently unfair, it is unlikely it would have denied standing to
such a large group of injured plaintiffs. See id. at 737-38. The Court's proferred justification,
eliminating the dangers of vexatious litigation, is highly dubious. Other methods for limiting
the dangers of abuse by plaintiffs could have been devised. Indeed, the majority opinion recognizes in the end that the facts in Blue Chip Stamps themselves seem to pose none of the
problems to which the Court adverts in its opinion. Id. at 754-55.
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mation. The Court was faced with the option of limiting the class of
plaintiffs to actual buyers and sellers, or expanding the class to include three other groups2 00 These groups were: (1) potential purchasers who did not purchase because of gloomy representations
made about the corporation; 0 ' (2) actual shareholders who did not
sell because of unduly rosy representations;20 2 and (3) shareholders,
creditors, and others related to the issuer who suffered a loss in the
value of their investment because of corporate or insider activities in
connection with the illegal purchase or sale of securities by
insiders. 3
In Blue Chip Stamps the fairness rationale informed the
Court's liability theory. The damages that accrue to plaintiffs under
this theory result from what they would have done had they had the
same information as the insiders.20 4 In effect, damages are based on
the opportunity cost imposed upon the plaintiffs by the defendants'
illegal trading. 205 As such, there is no rational basis for restricting
recovery to buyers and sellers. Even the Blue Chip Stamps opinion
acknowledged that "the Birnbaum limitation on the plaintiff class in
a Rule 10b-5 action for damages is an arbitrary restriction which
unreasonably prevents some deserving plaintiffs from recovering
damages. '"206 A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose plaintiff X sells a share of stock of ABC Corp. for $10.00, then watches
the price of the stock rise to $100.00 on the basis of some exciting
news concerning the corporation. If an insider has bought after
learning the news but before it is publicly announced, X may sue the
200. Id. at 737-38.
201. Id. at 737.
202. Id. at 737-38.
203. Id. at 738.
204. See Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lob-5:. A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1984).
205. As used here, the term "opportunity costs" refers to the value of the profits foregone by the plaintiffs as a result of buying or selling stock during a time in which insiders are
trading. This is consistent with the economic definition, in which "cost" is defined as the most
valuable forsaken alternative to an act. Opportunity cost is defined as the most valuable alternative that must be forsaken to undertake a given act. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE
& PRODUCTION 464 (3d ed. 1983).

206. 421 U.S. at 738. The Court was citing Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era For Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968). There were a host of other
articles critical of the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement. See, e.g., Boone & McGowan,
Standing to Sue underSEC Rule lOb-5, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 617 (1971); Bromberg, Are There
Limits to Rule lOb-5?, 29:S THE Bus. LAW. 167 (1974); Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant lOb-5 Developments, 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 305 (1975). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, the SEC filed an amicus brief arguing against the Birnbaum rule. 421 U.S. at 738.
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insider for damages. Consistent with the fairness theory, X's recovery will equal the $90.00 that was "lost" or foregone as a result of
the sale to the insider. But suppose X did not buy or sell, but can
prove that she would have bought the stock but was dissuaded from
doing so by gloomy pronouncements by the insider. X's. loss would be
just as tangible as if she had actually sold to a purchasing insider.
Yet under the Birnbaum rule, X is prohibited from suing.
In this example X should have no right to recover at all, since
she suffered no harm by the insider's trading.20 7 Given a choice between applying a misguided theory of liability narrowly or expansively, Justice Rehnquist, in Chiarella, chose the expedient, albeit
intellectually barren course. 08
2. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc. - The recent case of Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc.2 0° is a striking illustration of the confusion surrounding the rule of standing in lOb-5 cases in the wake of
Chiarella.As in Chiarella,the cause of action in Moss arose in the
context of a corporate tender offer. E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. was
employed in the mergers and acquisitions department of Morgan
Stanley & Co., a New York investment bank.210 Courtois tipped several of his colleagues in the investment banking world about a tender
offer planned by Warner-Lambert Company, a Morgan Stanley client, for Deseret Pharmaceutical Company. On November 30, 1976,
James M. Newman, a stockbroker, bought 11,700 shares of Deseret
stock on the basis of information supplied by Courtois. Among the
sellers of Deseret stock that day was the plaintiff, Michael Moss,
who sold 5,000 shares on the market for $28.00 per share. 1 '
A week after Moss sold his stock, Warner-Lambert publicly announced its tender offer for Deseret at $38.00 per share, and Moss
brought a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 against Newman and
Morgan Stanley. The Second Circuit, applying the fiduciary duty
standard espoused in Chiarella,1 2 concluded that Newman owed no
21 I
duty of disclosure to Moss and upheld the dismissal of Moss' suit.
Consistent with the analysis in this Article, the court held that the
207.

See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.

208. 421 U.S. at 727 ("the only portion of the litigation .

.

. before us is whether"

plaintiffs may sue without being purchasers or sellers). See also supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
209. 719 F.2d 5 (2d. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
210. 719 F.2d at 8.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 12-17.

213. Id. at 23.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss1/2

42

Macey: From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
1984]

FROM FAIRNESS TO CONTRACT

only fiduciary duties Newman breached were to Morgan Stanley and
Warner. In the words of the court, the plaintiff could not attain
standing by riding "'piggyback upon the duty owed by defendants to
Morgan Stanley and Warner.' "214
The opinion in Moss illustrates that the holding in Chiarella,
which requires the presence of a preexisting fiduciary duty to sustain
a 1Ob-5 suit, cannot be reconciled with the holding in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, which requires that private plaintiffs
in lOb-5 cases be actual purchasers or sellers. Under the Blue Chip
Stamps doctrine Morgan Stanley does not have standing to sue because it was not a purchaser or a seller, yet under the reasoning in
Chiarella,Morgan Stanley is the injured party. Purchasers and sellers such as Moss, who do have standing to sue under Blue Chip
Stamps, have no basis for recovery because the defendants owe them
no fiduciary duty. The logical implication of this analysis is that
Chiarella overrules Blue Chip Stamps. If there is a private right of
action under Rule 1Ob-5 it must be to the party to whom a fiduciary
duty is breached, not to purchasers and sellers.2 16
3. Standing and the Business Property Theory. - Under a business property theory the proper plaintiffs are the owners of the privileged information, and ought to be the sole private parties eligible to
bring suit to enforce their property interest. It is important to note,
however, that it may not always be possible to protect a property
interest in information by seeking redress in the courts. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur for example, the corporation could not have prevented
outside parties who lawfully found out about the presence of the rich
mineral deposits from taking advantage of this knowledge. Had
other parties lawfully learned of the discovery, they could have purchased the mineral rights in the land for themselves. Barring that,
they could have profited by purchasing TGS stock. 16 Similarly, if
other investment analysts had discovered the fraud at Equity Fund214. Id. at 13 (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1353
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
215. The only alternative is to deny a private right of action under lOb-5 in most cases.
After Chiarellaa private right of action still exists in cases where the defendant has purchased
stock in his own firm on the basis of inside information. Such an insider will owe a fiduciary

duty to the shareholders in the firm for which he works, and hence both the purchaser-seller
requirement of Blue Chip Stamps and the fiduciary duty requirement of Chiarella are satisfied. But, where the insider sells stock on the basis of negative inside information, purchasing
plaintiffs would be barred from recovery because of the lack of fiduciary duty owed to the
purchasers.
216. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-33.
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ing simultaneously or shortly after Dirks' investigation, Dirks would
have had no basis for protecting his ability to profit from the
information.
In the two examples above, Dirks and TGS, as owners of the
information, would have no legal basis for preventing third parties
from profiting from their discoveries: they would not have an exclusive property right in the information, and the third parties would
not have any fiduciary duty to respect a prior property right in the
interest by keeping the information confidential.21 In the Texas
Gulf Sulphur example, the third party discoverers would owe no
duty to the corporation absent some specific relationship giving rise
to such a duty. 218 The same reasoning would apply in the Dirks hypothetical to prevent Mr. Dirks from stopping others from investigating the fraud at Equity Funding.
It would be possible for Congress to protect discoverers of socially valuable inside information by allowing something akin to
copyright protection for such material. It is not at all obvious, however, that it would be desirable to afford such protection. 219 The
stock market will be more efficient if the parties who produce valuable inside information have incentives to trade soon after discovery.
In this way the information becomes reflected in the stock price
more quickly, and the market will serve as a more efficient guide for
the allocation of capital generally.
This reasoning is consistent with the proper subject of contract
analysis.220 In the above examples the parties making the initial discovery had no contractual relationship with the third parties threatening to usurp their discoveries. While there is some justification for
constraining the actiojns of such third parties, in most instances it is
competition from third parties such as these that provides greater
impetus for the initial discoverers to act quickly, thus making the
marketplace more efficient. 22 '
217. Id.
218. Id. at 232.
219. While society has incentives to promote the production of information, the particular kind of information that is subject to the protection of the copyright laws is information
that has continuing value in the public domain for long periods of time. Valuable information
pertaining to stock prices, by contrast, is of value to society only when actually used. See supra
notes 110-I and accompanying text. As the text following this footnote indicates, the more
quickly insiders use this information, the better. Laws that would make it easier for insiders to
delay trading on valuable information should therefore be discouraged.
220. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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Put another way, TGS could protect its property interest from
parties with whom it had no privity of contract only by working to
keep its interest secret. Dirks could enable his clients to profit from
his knowledge of the fraud at Equity Funding by making sure that
they were among the first to know about it.
While the only parties who should be permitted to bring lawsuits for violations of Rule lOb-5 are the proper owners of the information being stolen, defendants in these cases should not be strictly
limited to those who are in privity of contract with the owners of the
information. Owners of privileged information should also be permitted to seek redress against "tippees" who receive such information
from parties in privity with the owner. The Wall Street Journalhad
a contractual relationship with R. Foster Winans, whom it employed
as a writer. His four accomplices, who reaped profits of $900,000,
are akin to recipients of stolen goods. Someone who receives stolen
property is culpable if he knows or should have known that the merchandise was stolen.222 The same reasoning applies to insider trading
under the Court's current business property approach. As the Court
pointed out in Dirks:
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and23the tippee knows or
2
should know that there has been a breach.
The relationship between the tipper and the owner of the privileged information should determine the tippee's legal obligation to
the owner of the property interest.224 As the Court observed in
Dirks, "the tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from
that of the insider's duty. 2 25 Under a business property analysis the
owners of the stolen information should be the sole private parties
with standing to sue for violation of Rule lOb-5, and they should be
able to proceed not only against those with whom they are in privity,
but against derivative tippees as well.
222.

See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 88 (1972).

223.

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.

224. This liability theory is consistent with the Court's fiduciary duty theory, although
not with the Court's pecuniary gain theory. Also, in determining liability it should make no
difference whether the tipper was an actual employee of the firm or whether the tipper was an
independent contractor, such as a printer, accountant, lawyer or a consultant. Id. at 655 n.14.
225. 463 U.S. at 659. See also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
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B. Damages in Private Lawsuits
As described above, the party damaged by insider trading is the
owner of the information misappropriated. 226 The amount of damages sustained by the owner will depend on both the nature of the
owner's business and the subject matter of the information pilfered.
The proper measure of damages can best be explained by reference
to specific examples.
1. The Measure of Damages in Chiarella. - Suppose XYZ
corporation is making a tender offer for ABC corporation. The XYZ
company has hired Pandick Press to do the necessary financial printing, and Vincent Chiarella has been assigned to do the typesetting
work. Chiarella deduces that XYZ is making a bid for ABC and
buys ABC stock.
These purchases may or may not signal the market that XYZ is
making a bid for ABC. 227 If they do, Chiarella's action will drive the
price of ABC stock up to the level at which the market expects it to
trade if a successful offer is made, discounted by the probability of
the offer ultimately being successful. The purchases are damaging to
XYZ, the offering company, because the tender offer will appear less
attractive to target shareholders. The purchases may even cause the
tender offer to fail. 228 Alternatively, it is possible that Chiarella's
purchases will drive up the price of ABC stock by signalling the
market in a more general way that there is good news on the horizon. If so, the damages to XYZ may not be as great.229 It is even
possible that Chiarella's purchases will not affect the market at all.
If the purchases do not cause the price of ABC stock to rise,230 then
ABC, the owner of the information, is not injured by Chiarella's
trading. Its damages, therefore, are zero. As discussed below, 231
while it might be desirable to impose fines or penalties on Chiarella
in order to deter him and others from such activity in the future,
there is no particular reason to permit XYZ to receive a windfall
from Chiarella's illegal activity. Thieves are generally subject to
both civil damages and criminal fines. Such a dual enforcement
See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
228. 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CORPORATE AcQuisITIONS AND
MERGERS § 27.05[4] (1984).
226.
227.

229. Damages will be lower because the price of ABC stock may not rise as much due to
the greater uncertainty in the market about the nature of the information being transmitted.
230. It is unlikely that the purchases will not affect the price of the stock at all. See
Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 336.
231. See infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
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scheme is likely to provide an optimal level of protection for legitimate property interests.13 2 Such an enforcement mechanism is available for violations of insider trading rules, but it is not being properly applied by the SEC.
2. Damages in the Wall Street Journal Case. - While the assessment of damages in Chiarella could be made with some precision, determining the harm caused to the Wall Street Journal by
Mr. Winan's behavior is not so simple. The damage he caused was
primarily to the newspaper's reputation. As noted above, the Journal
made a concerted effort to mitigate its damages by conducting an
investigation of the incident and firing Winans. 233 Nonetheless, some
damage was probably done, and certainly some costs were associated
with the paper's efforts to mitigate. Yet the Court's standing decision in Blue Chip Stamps prevents the Wall Street Journal from
seeking reimbursement from Winans under Rule 10b-5.
The amount of injury sustained by the Journal may bear no
relation to the $900,000 made in actual trading by the tippees. The
proper measure of damages may be arrived at by looking at such
objective criteria as the paper's lost advertising revenues and circulation. Once again, however, it should be noted that to achieve optimal
enforcement, penalties in excess of actual damages may be desirable
due to the difficulty of detecting insider trading abuses.
3. Damages in Texas Gulf Sulphur. - Texas Gulf Sulphur was
damaged by the insider trading in its stock to the extent that such
trading informed the market about the firm's discovery and drove
the acquisition price of the mineral rights above their pre-trading
level.234 Since the insider trading was conducted by top officials in
the company, including the firm's president and general counsel,235 a
shareholder derivative suit would be the most appropriate means to
redress the harm done to the corporation.236 Even if the insider trading did not cause the corporation to pay more for the mineral rights,
TGS might still have suffered damages as a result of the insiders'
trading. Unless the insiders had been assigned the firm's property
rights in the privileged information as part of their compensation
package, they were usurping a valuable corporate opportunity by
232.
233.

See infra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.

234.

See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.

235.

See 401 F.2d at 840 n.2 for a list of the trading done by the parties.

236.

Under current law, however, these shareholders do not have standing to sue. See

supra notes 197-225 and accompanying text.
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profiting from the trading activity themselves rather than assigning
the profits to the shareholders.2 3 7 If the corporation had not assigned
the property interest to the insiders, the corporation's damages would
be increased by the amount of the insider's gains.
Consequently, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the damages from the
insider's trading would equal the sum of (1) any increase in the cost
of the mineral rights resulting from the insider trading and (2) any
profits made by insiders who were not contractually entitled to engage in trading on the basis of the corporation's information. Damages would be zero if the insiders were contractually entitled to trade
and such trading did not signal the market as to the firm's plans.
Even if the firm had assigned the insiders the right to profit
from its information, shareholders could reasonably expect that such
trading be conducted so as to avoid harm to the corporation. For this
reason, even if the insiders were contractually entitled to trade on
the basis of the inside information, a derivative action would be appropriate if the trading were done in such a way as to harm the
corporation's shareholders by prematurely alerting the market to the
mineral discovery.
C. The Disclose or Abstain Rule
In Chiarella, the Court did not decide whether the defendant
had breached a fiduciary duty to his employer by trading on the
tender offer information he uncovered.2 8 In United States v. Newman, 239 the Second Circuit held that a duty to keep such information
confidential was breached when insiders misappropriated information belonging to the clients of an investment banking concern. 40
These cases make it clear that the obligation to refrain from trading
stems from a preexisting contractual obligation to not engage in such
activity. By parity of reasoning, it is clear that where there is such a
duty, it is breached as much by wrongful disclosure as by wrongful
237.

On the other hand, if the right to trade were part of the executives' compensation

package, a shareholder in a derivative suit would have no more right to bring a suit for insider
trading "than to challenge directly a salary or bonus decision." See Carlton & Fischel, supra
note 4, at 890. Carlton and Fischel do not consider the possibility that the insiders may be
subject to a derivative suit if they abuse their privilege to trade on inside information by
damaging the corporation. Salary and bonus decisions do not present fiduciaries with the same

possibility for abuse. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 189 (discussing managerial
shirking).
238. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
239.

664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).

240. See id. at 17.
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trading.
During the fairness era insiders could avoid liability by refraining from trading until making disclosure of the confidential information they possessed.241 Such disclosure absolved the insider of
liability because the courts' liability theory was based on the supposed unfairness caused by the asymmetry of information between
the trading parties.2 42 Disclosure, by definition, eliminated the asymmetry of information and thus the unfairness involved in the transaction. The following example, drawn from Texas Gulf Sulphur, illustrates the point.
On April 16, 1964, the insiders at Texas Gulf Sulphur released
an official statement that detailed the precise nature of the firm's
Canadian ore discovery. 43 The court absolved from liability those
insiders who traded after the official statement had been disseminated to the market. 44 If the insiders in Texas Gulf Sulphur had
held this press conference before the company had finished acquiring
the land containing the mineral deposits, the firm would have been
severely damaged. The price for the mineral rights TGS was trying
to acquire would have risen sharply once the discovery became
known to the land's owners. Holding the press conference before acquiring the mineral rights, in order to trade legally, would clearly
have been a breach of the insiders' fiduciary duty to TGS.
Trading insiders can thus breach the very fiduciary duty that
Chiarella describes, while making the sort of disclosure that the Second Circuit held was essential to avoiding liability under the fairness
theory. As with other aspects of the Court's fiduciary duty theory,2 45
the foregoing analysis is consistent with the business property theory
set forth in this Article. Permitting defendants to avoid liability by
disclosure is "antithetical to the basic notion of a property right,
which by definition entails the legal protection of private appropriation for private benefit." 246 Insider liability results from the misappropriation of someone else's property, and damages may result from
the owner's loss of the use of such information. Disclosure prevents
the owner from profiting by use of the information in precisely the
241. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
242. Id.

243.

Id. at 846-47.

244. Id. at 848.
245. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
246. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and
the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 13 (1978).
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same way as does trading.247
A fundamental characteristic of ownership is the right to exclude others from using the thing that constitutes the property interest. The owner's right to exclude others from using a piece of inside
information is compromised by an agent's disclosure of that information to others. If an owner has the right to prevent his agent from
trading on some item of information, the owner must also have the
right to prevent the agent from disclosing it to others.
By now it should be clear that the disclose or abstain doctrine,
like the current rules on standing and damages, cannot be reconciled
with the fiduciary duty theory of insider trading liability. The proper
subject of contract analysis described in this Article clarifies and reinforces this conclusion. The contract between the insider and the
owner of information is the source of the fiduciary duty not to trade.
This contract also creates a fiduciary duty not to disclose, since the
information's owner may be harmed even more by disclosure than by
trading.
D. The Desirability of Public Enforcement: Agency Costs
If the basis for insider trading liability stems from a business
property theory that is properly evaluated by the proper subject of
contract analysis, it is not at all obvious that rules beyond traditional
agency and contract principles are necessary to constrain improper
insider trading.248 The groups that benefit from proper application of
the insider trading rules are the firms to whom the information belongs. Shouldn't these firms bear the enforcement costs of these
rules?
Insider trading activity that damages a firm is simply another
form of agency cost with which the firm must contend. There is
often a substantial divergence of interests between a firm's shareholders and its managers. Managers frequently do things that are
not in the best interests of the shareholders. Classic examples of such
behavior range from outright embezzlement, to usurpation of corporate opportunities, to corporate contributions to a manager's favorite
charities. From the firm's perspective, insider trading involves precisely the same sorts of agency problems as do the examples above.
247. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices adjust to insider trading because such trading provides the market with new information concerning the corporation
whose stock is being traded. Of course, direct disclosure of such information accomplishes the
same thing.
248. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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The SEC does not provide an expensive enforcement mechanism
by which firms can police the usurpation of corporate opportunities,
so why should it provide such a mechanism for policing insider trading? An argument can be crafted that public enforcement of a ban
on insider trading is needed for the same reasons that public enforcement is needed to curb wrongful conduct generally. Relying exclusively on corporations to police the insider trading abuses of its
agents may result in a suboptimal level of enforcement. The difficulty of detecting insider trading, the large gains for those who escape detection, and the large economies of scale in monitoring,249 all
suggest that the contract law remedies available to firms damaged
by insider trading are insufficient to achieve an optimal level of
enforcement.
Corporate insiders, like all potential wrongdoers, are deterred
from wrongful conduct because they expect to be punished if caught;
deterrence is therefore a function of the penalty for wrongful conduct multiplied by the probability that such punishment will be imposed.250 The more difficult insider trading is to detect, the more severe the punishment must be in order to prevent such activity. There
is a great deal of evidence to support the conclusion that insider
trading is remarkably hard to detect.25 ' Insider trading can be conducted in virtually complete secrecy. Monitoring insider trading requires that market transactions be watched closely. 252 It is likely that
significant economies of scale are realized by having institutions such
249.
250.

See infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. PoL EcoN. 526, 527 (1970).

Enforcement problems seem particularly acute in the area of insider trading, where the "frequent and open violations demonstrate that the present enforcement system has not deterred

insider trading appreciably." Dooley, supra note 34, at 2. See Stigler at 527. See also
Schwartz & Tullock, The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 78 (1975).
251. See Dooley, supra note 34, at 2, 5-17. The SEC has attempted to obtain a high

level of deterrence by concentrating its enforcement on highly publicized cases.
252.

At first blush, it may seem that the firm for which one works is the lowest cost

monitor of insider trading activity. The primary monitors of insider trading, however, are the
organized exchanges, the SEC, and the NASD (National Association of Securities Dealers).

These institutions monitor all trading activity within their respective jurisdictions via a complex and sophisticated computer tracking system. Of course, once the monitoring has been
completed and the inside trader apprehended, it does not follow that the firm whose information was appropriated should be barred from determining whether to proceed with litigation. It

is typical in the realm of criminal law to permit the victim to determine whether to press
charges against the wrongdoer. Similarly, in insider trading cases the firm whose information
is appropriated should be able to determine how to proceed. It may be the case, however, that

a derivative suit by a shareholder will be necessary in order for the firm's interests to be
adequately protected.
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as the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) conduct these activities.253 But the SEC's monitoring activities overlap with the activities of private organization such as the NASD and the NYSE
which conduct monitoring activities at no charge to the taxpayer.
There is no evidence that such double surveillance is necessary, and
it is not obvious why the SEC is needed as a supplement to the private sector. The SEC spends millions of dollars on enforcement, yet
brings relatively few cases, 2 " providing further support for the position that its efforts are superfluous at best.
The ease with which insiders can escape detection implies that
punishment for those who are caught must be harsh. Thus the optimal fine may greatly exceed the amount of the damages that the
injured party could collect in a contract suit. Yet society may be
reluctant to permit the owners of insider information to collect sufficient penalties to effectively deter future violations by others. Penalty
clauses are voidable in contract suits, 255 but recovery of actual damages might prove an insufficient deterrent.
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA)258 extends
the enforcement remedies available to the SEC by permitting it to
recover penalties of three times the profit gained or loss avoided from
insider trading. The ITSA also increases the maximum criminal penalty for knowing and willful violations of the Act from $10,000 to
$100,000.257 The damages won in lawsuits brought by the SEC are
to be paid into the U.S. Treasury, and do not affect the rights of
plaintiffs to bring private suits. If applied in a manner consistent
with the analysis presented in this Article, the provisions of the
253. See The SEC's Spy System" Monitoring Computers - And Fielding Tips, Business week, April 23, 1984 at 29 (describing SEC's computerized surveillance system); Dooley,

supra note 34.
254, Dooley, supra note 34, at 73 (very few cases are brought, and the existing system
of SEC enforcement is so costly that it is "indefensible").
255, U.C.C. § 2-718(1). "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void
as a penalty." Id. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. CONTRACTS 564-65 (1977). Under the U.C.C.
the question of whether damages are "unreasonable" may be determined not only at the time
the contract is signed, but also ex post in light of the actual harm suffered by the parties. See

W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 171 (1966).
The basis for the rule that penalty clauses are not enforceable is that parties may only agree as
to terms that affect their primary rights. They are not free to establish remedies, since that is

the role of public law rather than private contractual law. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra at
565.
256. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (Supp. 1984)).
257. Id.
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ITSA will help compensate for the disparity between the expected
benefit and the expected penalty for engaging in insider trading. To
the extent that the penalties collected by the SEC compensate it for
the cost of maintaining a monitoring and enforcement mechanism,
the public is relieved of the burden of this expense.
As a practical matter, it is highly doubtful that the SEC will be
able to cover the costs of its enforcement scheme with the proceeds it
takes in from insider trading suits. The deficit must be made up by
the public. In addition, the SEC is likely to pursue an enforcement
policy that conforms to the SEC's agenda rather than to the public
interest or the directives of the Supreme Court. 258 Concerns about
the optimal use of information have never dominated the Commission's agenda in the past. The SEC seems to be reluctant to follow
the direction of the Supreme Court in moving towards enforcement
of Rule lOb-5 in such a way as to promote the efficient use of information. For this and other reasons, it is by no means certain that
public enforcement is necessary in order to achieve the optimal level
of enforcement. It may be that private remedies provide the optimal
level of deterrence, especially when the costs of public enforcement
are taken into account. 259
Arguments in favor of a purely private enforcement scheme are
considerably strengthened by closer consideration of the total costs
visited upon those caught engaging in stock trading in violation of a
258. The Chairman of the SEC, John S.R. Shad, has repeatedly asserted that insider
trading must be curtailed to eliminate the broad perception that the public is treated unfairly
when insider trading occurs. See supra note 133 (quoting Chairman Shad). The SEC Chairman's remarks are in sharp contrast to the language of the Supreme Court in Chiarella,where
Justice Powell specifically rejected the contention that insiders owe a general duty to the
market:
We cannot affirm [Chiarella's] conviction without recognizing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically
from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between
two parties, .... should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.
445 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted).
Professor Dooley suggests that the SEC's private agenda called for enlarging the scope of Rule
lOb-5 because, in so doing, the SEC "solidified its position in the vanguard of the movement to
federalize corporate law and thus assured itself a central role in any future regulatory
scheme." See Dooley, supra note 34, at 62.
259. The monitoring described above is, of course, enormously expensive. In the case of
SEC enforcement, the costs are borne not only by people active in the securities markets, but
by taxpayers generally. This is not the case with the monitoring mechanisms established by the
organized exchanges, where member firms pay the costs associated with monitoring insider
trading.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

53

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 13:9

preexisting duty. These costs, which include such things as damage
to the defendant's reputation and personal stature, as well as loss of
future employment opportunities, greatly enhance the deterrent effects of contractual remedies. As a result of R. Foster Winans' illegal activities while employed at the Wall Street Journal, for example, it is highly unlikely that Winans will be able to obtain
employment as a financial columnist in the near future. His expected
punishment under a purely private enforcement scheme, therefore,
includes not only the return of the illegal trading profits, but also the
future income he forfeits as a consequence of his ultra vires trading
activity. Similarly, the prospects of Chiarella locating employment
as a financial printer are remote.
From the previous discussion it should be clear that determining
the optimal level of enforcement will not be easy. The realization
that inside information is a legally cognizable private property interest, however, does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the regulatory power of the state should not be used to police the interest.
The police power of the state is used to protect virtually all private
property interests. In other contexts it has been recognized that special protection must be provided by the state in order to protect the
value of certain information. 260 The ephemeral, intangible nature of
information augers in favor of special protection.
In a recent and important article, Professors Carlton and Fischel correctly observe that the most efficient level of enforcement of
insider trading rules would be reached by permitting state rather
than federal law to determine the applicable legal rules.2" 1 They are
mistaken, however, when they claim that "public enforcement with
high penalties might deter a significant amount of beneficial, consensual insider trading. ' 2 6 2 If the proper subject of contract test suggested in this Article were adopted, beneficial insider trading would
260. See supra note 109.
261. See Carlton & Fischel supra note 2, at 890-91. See also P, WINTER, GOVERNMENT
AND THE CORPORATION (1978) (arguing that in order to obtain the revenue associated with
attracting corporations to their states, the states have incentives to pass corporation laws that
benefit shareholders). Thus, as Professors Carlton and Fischel conclude, "[tihe preferable
course would be to allow competition among states, rather than federal fiat, to resolve the issue
of the desirability of public enforcement of nonconsensual insider trading." Carlton & Fischel,
supra at 891.
262. Id. If institutions such as the SEC began enforcing insider trading laws to protect
property rights in information, rather than to uphold an elusive value such as fairness and
equality among traders, then strict public enforcement with high penalties would only serve to
enhance the value of the property right. Public enforcement of other property rights does not
prevent the parties who own such rights from taking advantage of them.
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not be proscribed. The danger to which Carlton and Fischel advert
results from the current confusion in the courts as to the proper allocation of the property right in the information. Under the test proposed in this Article, the information belongs to the corporation if
the information might properly be the subject of a contract between
the corporation and its agents.
As Carlton and Fischel observe, the SEC's prosecution of Raymond Dirks, if successful, would have had an "adverse effect. . on
incentives to acquire valuable information" because it would deprive
investment analysts of the "incentive to invest resources to gather
information in the first place. ' 26 3 Adoption of the proper subject of
contract test would result in only harmful insider trading being proscribed. Beneficial conduct, like that of Mr. Dirks, would not be
affected. 6 4
In all likelihood, the best way to police insider trading would
feature a central monitoring system as a means to supplement the
contractual obligations that this Article argues are at the heart of
the Court's 1Ob-5 analysis. Under this enforcement scheme, the SEC
-

or better yet, a private firm or firms -

would continue to serve as

a monitor of illegal trading activity, and supply the information
about such trading to the rightful owner of the information. The
party legally entitled to use the information could then determine
how best to proceed. If a corporate employee is found trading on
information that rightfully belongs to his employer, the corporation's
determination about whether to press charges should be subject to
the usual cautions about intra-firm conflicts of interest, particularly
where the employee is also a member of the firm's board of directors.
Conclusion
The purpose of this Article has been to point out that the legitimate policy concerns about insider trading are really concerns about
the proper allocation of property rights in valuable information. The
Supreme Court's recent opinions in Dirks and Chiarella,by focusing
on the fiduciary duty owed by traders to the owners of insider information, employ a method of analysis consistent with this hypothesis.
Justice Powell, speaking for the Court in Dirks, erred in his attempt
to devise a useful method of assigning property rights to such information. His method, the "pecuniary gain" test, will not result in the
263. Id. at 885.
264.

See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
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optimal allocation of valuable information. This Article has suggested a proper subject of contract test as the means for assigning
property rights in information. Application of this alternative test
will allow privileged corporate information to be used in the way
that maximizes societal welfare.
Finally, this Article has pointed out several inconsistencies in
the law that have arisen since the Court formulated its fiduciary
duty theory of insider trading liability. These inconsistencies are not
likely to survive the test of time. The intellectual history of insider
trading liability posited in this Article suggests strongly that over
time, the Court's analysis tends to eliminate incoherence and inconsistency. This Article has described the direction the law should take
to eliminate existing anomalies in such areas as standing and damages. Specifically, the owners of the information that is being traded
upon should be granted standing to sue for its misappropriation, and
the harm to such owners should provide the sole measure of damages
in lOb-5 cases.
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